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 Abstract 
Sea Enterprise is the resource-enabling component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 
initiative.  In recognition of a future resource-constrained environment, Sea Enterprise seeks 
to reform the culture and business practices of the Navy so as to generate resources internally 
that can be applied to reinvestment and recapitalization.  Sea Enterprise contracted the Center 
for Defense Management Reform to research transformation and benchmarking best 
practices in the private sector. The aim of this research is to help Sea Enterprise understand, 
design and implement its agenda for organizational change.   
This report presents a brief recent history of management reform within the 
Department of Defense and a summary review of current business management 
transformation initiatives in the DoD and in the services. Then, a survey of the scholarly and 
practitioner literature on organizational change explores the questions of first-order and 
second-order change, and looks at models of incremental, episodic and continuous change.  
Next, this report examines various types of benchmarking and identifies benchmarking 
candidates from both private- and public-sector organizations categorized by distinctive best 
practices that may be applicable to Sea Enterprise.   
The report concludes that further in-depth benchmarking by matching Sea Enterprise 
with specific organizations could contribute to the success of Sea Enterprise.  Modeling and 
benchmarking can help the leaders and managers of Sea Enterprise understand, promote, and 
advance the success of this important change initiative. 
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 Executive Summary 
Sea Enterprise is the resource-enabling component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 
initiative.  In recognition of a future resource-constrained environment, Sea Enterprise seeks 
to reform the culture and business practices of the Navy so as to generate resources internally 
that can be applied to reinvestment and recapitalization.  Sea Enterprise contracted the Center 
for Defense Management Reform to research transformation and benchmarking best 
practices in the private sector. The aim of this research is to help Sea Enterprise understand, 
design and implement its agenda for organizational change.   
This report presents a brief recent history of management reform within the 
Department of Defense, and a summary review of current business management 
transformation initiatives in the DoD and in the services. Recent defense business 
management reform can be traced from the Blue Ribbon Commission (The Packard 
Commission) under President Reagan through to the present-day Bush Administration. The 
term “transformation” first arose during President Clinton’s second term, although the 
suggested processes for improvement employed are remarkably similar to those of past (and 
future) administrations, namely streamlining, managing overhead costs, and adopting best 
practices from the private sector. Recurring themes throughout the administrations include 
culture change, efficiency through streamlining, cost reduction, and improved management 
processes. The DoD and its component services are transforming business practices in 
response to a changing resource environment.  Both the Army and the Air Force have 
undertaken efforts that are in concert with the DoD’s “bread and butter” approach and 
consistent with the Navy’s efficiency/cost-savings focus, in which the dominant form of 
xiii 
 transformation is designed to wring efficiencies from the system and allow “cash spin” of the 
savings to fund additional priorities.    
  A survey of the scholarly and practitioner literature on organizational change 
explores the questions of first-order and second-order change, and looks at models of 
incremental, episodic and continuous change. The literature suggests that few organizations 
which manage to create persistently successful models of change exist, but those that do 
share the key traits of adaptability, a commitment to learning and growth, and agility.  
  Next, this report examines various types of benchmarking and identifies 
benchmarking candidates from both private- and public-sector organizations categorized by 
distinctive best practices that may be applicable to Sea Enterprise.  Benchmarking is one 
approach to implementing change initiatives into an organization. Benchmarking involves a 
process of improvement through studying and implementing existing best practices for 
improvement. This section provides an overview of benchmarking, an explanation of 
benchmarking typologies, explores the question of organizational readiness, examines the 
actual process involved in benchmarking (including examples of benchmarking models), and 
looks at the future of benchmarking.  The report then specifically identifies benchmarking 






 Vision      Internal Communications 
British Airways   Coca Cola 
Harley Davidson   Intel    
HP     HP 
Southwest Airlines   Southwest Airlines 
Whirlpool 
 
Realignment of    Measurement and 
Enterprise Organization  Evaluation 
FAA     Boston Consulting Group 
IBM     US Postal Service 
K-Mart 
 
Process Change   Cost Management 
GE (Six Sigma)   FAA    
Motorola (Six Sigma)   Harley Davidson 
Toyota (Lean Manufacturing) Southwest Airlines 
World Bank (Knowledge Mgt) Whirlpool 
     General Motors 
     Ford 
  
The report concludes that further in-depth benchmarking by matching Sea Enterprise 
with specific organizations could contribute to the success of Sea Enterprise.  Modeling and 
benchmarking can help the leaders and managers of Sea Enterprise understand, promote, and 
advance the success of this important change initiative. Based on this work, it is possible to 
develop a model of successful transformation, employ that model to evaluate Sea Enterprise 
xv 
 and make recommendations in specific areas (such as in communications where N4 has 
recently initiated a research engagement), and more closely identify benchmarking partners 
to determine the potential for applying their "best practices" to Sea Enterprise.    
Finally, we recommend that Sea Enterprise consider supporting a research program to 
address the questions of sustaining its change initiative through leadership transitions and 
declining base budgets, both of which are conditions that the Navy may face in the near-term 
future.  
xvi 
 I. Introduction 
Changing the business operations of defense is necessary to support transformed 
warfighting capability.  Moreover, defense business management reform is needed to deal 
with fiscal stress caused by internal and external pressures on defense resources.  Internal 
pressures from rising costs for manpower, health care, acquisition, operations and 
maintenance are constraining discretionary spending inside the defense budget, forcing 
suboptimal trade-offs in resource allocation decisions.  External pressures from the budget 
deficit, rising costs for Social Security and Medicare, and pressure from other discretionary 
programs in the Federal budget suggest that total resources allocated for defense will be 
further constrained in the foreseeable future.  Defense spending as a percent of GDP and as a 
percent of the federal budget has been generally declining for decades—albeit with 
significant increases in the past few years.  Now, there is the possibility that the total amount 
of current dollars could fall as well, and even more certainty that the rate of growth seen in 
the most recent years will not be sustained.   
Sea Power 21 is a vision of the 21st-century Navy that addresses imperatives for its 
mission, people and resources. Sea Enterprise is the resource enabler for Sea Power 21, 
addressing the fiscal, resource and business-management issues associated with the vision. 
“Sea Enterprise is the Navy’s flagship effort for freeing up additional resources to support 
military transformation initiatives through streamlining naval business processes.”1  The 
vision of Sea Enterprise is to reduce costs in order to provide internally generated resources 
for reinvestment and recapitalization.  “Sea Enterprise will help us identify, devise, and 
implement the tools that facilitate appropriate levels of risk in the Navy’s business 
operations, and to undertake the types of reform and restructuring needed to significantly 
reduce operating costs.”2  Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, explains, 
“Sea Enterprise is about creating fiscal opportunity across the Navy enterprise.”3  Sea 
                                                 
1 Naval Transformation Roadmap (2006) 
2 https://ucsobdom02 (2006) 
3 Mullen (2004) 
1 
 Enterprise seeks to generate and reinvest savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to 
transform the Navy. 
Sea Enterprise has identified three imperatives: (1) change culture, (2) improve 
processes and structures, and (3) harvest savings.  It also seeks to encourage four “desired 
behaviors”: (1) Create a culture of readiness and productivity, (2) create a culture of 
execution and accountability, (3) challenge every assumption, and (4) promote an enterprise 
focus.  Specifically, Sea Enterprise states that its initiative: 
• Aggressively streamlines, integrates, and consolidates Navy organizational 
structures, while maximizing use of shared services across the enterprise to 
reduce cost. 
• Identifies burdensome overhead costs, divests non-core, underperforming or 
unnecessary products/services, and production capacity. 
• Develops business metrics linked to outputs for principal business areas that 
will evaluate enterprise efficiency performance. 
• Tracks and integrates Echelon II business initiatives, facilitates barrier 
removal and organizational impediments to change.4   
Sea Enterprise is guided by a vision—cost reduction to generate re-investable 
savings.  It has also identified organizational changes and behavioral or cultural objectives 
that support the vision, and it recognizes the role of metrics and tracking as tools to 
encourage and measure progress. In addition, it has identified priority areas of organizational 
restructuring and cost management.  Some of these were mentioned by former CNO, 
Admiral Vern Clark, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
Sea Enterprise is […] creating ideas that will improve our productivity and reduce our 
 overhead costs.  Its key objectives are to: 
• Leverage technology to improve performance and minimize manpower costs 
• Promote competition and reward innovation and efficiency 
• Challenge institutional encumbrances that impede creativity and boldness in 
innovation 
• Aggressively divest non-core, under-performing or unnecessary products, services 
and production capacity 
• Merge redundant efforts  
                                                 
4 www.usni.org 
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 • Minimize acquisition and lifecycle costs 
• Maximize in-service capital equipment utilization 
• Challenge every assumption, cost and requirement.5  
In the same testimony, Admiral Clark saw evidence of early success. “Department of 
the Navy senior leadership is actively engaged in tracking the execution of ongoing Sea 
Enterprise initiatives totaling approximately $40 billion and identifying $12.4 billion in cost 
savings and requirements mitigation across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).”6  
  The Navy’s Sea Enterprise advocate is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Material Readiness and Logistics), N4 in the Navy’s organizational language.  N4 has 
responsibility for advocating, encouraging, assisting and tracking initiatives that serve the 
organizational, managerial and financial objectives of Sea Enterprise. N4 has advised CNO 
and VCNO on transformation proposals and initiatives and briefed flag-level meetings and 
executive education seminars.  Communications programs, including a Navy-wide essay 
contest, have aimed at promoting Sea Enterprise through all levels of the Navy organization.  
N4 has produced a Navy Performance Excellence Guidebook (NPEG) to assist commands in 
their efforts to identify and gain efficiencies. However, Sea Enterprise is not a “program 
office.”   
The implementation philosophy of Sea Enterprise is that cost-management initiatives 
are enterprise-wide responsibilities; wherever cost savings and organizational efficiencies to 
generate internal capital occur throughout the Navy enterprise, Sea Enterprise exists.  And, 
indeed, major change initiatives like Task Force Lean at Naval Sea Systems Command, 
AirSpeed (Naval Aviation) and SHIPMAIN (Naval Surface Forces) serve as examples of the 
diffusion and adoption of Sea Enterprise. 
Admiral Mullen has set the cost savings goal.  He states that Navy must raise its 
recapitalization investment over the next five years to $275 billion from a projected $228 
billion and observes that this money “almost certainly will not come from increases in the 
                                                 
5 US Congress (2005, March 15) 
6 Ibid. 
3 
 Navy’s budget.”  He points to the most competitive and agile industries in the United States 
and argues that the industry standard for cost reduction is “generally 5-10 percent. Our goals 
should be similar.”7  Thus, the CNO suggests that there are lessons to be learned from  
benchmarking against other organizations to help the Navy succeed with Sea Enterprise.  
This report is an effort to assist N4 in exploring benchmarking as a means to further the 
objectives of Sea Enterprise.  
Most recently, Sea Enterprise has proposed structural and process changes to advance further 
the concept of enterprise alignment in the Navy, including creation of a Corporate Business Council 
and a matrix integration of warfighter enterprises with providers and enabler functions. The vision is 
for the enterprise to produce an output that is defined as “readiness at cost.” 
 N4 asked the NPS Center for Defense Management Reform to investigate industry 
transformation efforts to identify best practices and transformational models that can be 
adopted by Navy’s warfare enterprises or replicated enterprise-wide. Thus, we seek to 
identify and review models of transformation and innovation published in academic and 
practitioner journals and identify a sample of successful transformation efforts in industry, 
non-profits, and government.  Our goal is to understand what benchmarking is and how it 
works.  Then, we seek to identify organizations with best practices in specific areas of 
transformation and determine if and how selected best practices can inform business 
management transformation in the Navy.  This should ultimately suggest a roadmap for 
benchmarking industry best practices in a judicious, cost-effective manner that has a strong 
potential for being relevant and successful within the Navy context.  We focus particularly on 
the institutionalization of transformation practices and culture and the application of specific 
strategies and tactics at the leadership level.  We do not address specific functional area 
transformation such as inventory management, acquisition and contracting, or financial 
reporting. 
In the chapters that follow, we first examine briefly the recent history of defense 
management reform to set the context for the current business management transformation 
                                                 
7 Mullen (2004) 
4 
 agenda.  Next, we highlight major themes in organizational change that seem relevant to Sea 
Enterprise and which help to inform a better understanding of the change process upon which 
Sea Enterprise has embarked.  Chapter IV addresses the questions of what benchmarking is 
and how benchmarking can be done.  Chapter V identifies specific organizations as 
benchmarking candidates, grouping them by category of best practice and type of 
benchmarking model.  We also examine the transformation agenda of the Air Force to permit 
inter-service comparison.  The concluding chapter suggests an approach for further 
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 II. Recent History of Defense Business Management 
Reform 
The following section traces the antecedents in management reform of previous 
administrations. A look at the recent history provides a context to understand the current state 
of reform initiatives in the Department of Defense.  
Reagan and the Packard Commission 
On July 15, 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12516, which 
proposed the formation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. The 
Commission principally examined defense management policies and procedures, such as: 
• the budget process 
• the procurement system 
• legislative oversight 
• the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Unified and Specified Command system, the Military Departments, and the 
Congress.8   
David Packard chaired the Blue Ribbon Commission, which became known as the 
Packard Commission. Also serving on the committee was Frank C. Carlucci, who served as 
Secretary of Defense during the latter part of Reagan’s Administration. In an interim report 
to the President, the Packard Commission identified various “management shortfalls” and 
stated that “chances for meaningful improvement will come not from more regulation, but 
only with major institutional change.”9 Secretary of Defense Carlucci and his staff prepared 
the Defense Management Report for the President based on the defense management reforms 
identified by the Packard Commission. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Reagan (1985, July 15) 
7 
 Bush (41) Administration (1989-1993):  “A New Way of Doing 
Business”  
Improvement is an iterative process. True and long lasting improvement also requires changes in 
culture and philosophy. Long-term success also depends on cooperation from all who are involved 
with defense, including industry and the Congress. Perhaps most important to the success of 
reordering defense structures and management practices is the high level priority and focus given the 
DMR effort.  
 —DoD Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 
1991 
Defense management reform during the first Bush Administration stemmed largely 
from the Defense Management Report (DMR). The themes of “excellence and efficiency” 
characterized the reform initiatives of this Administration. Different from mere short-term 
budget reductions, the purpose of these reforms was to save money long-term through 
streamlined management practices and added efficiency measures. According to Defense 
Secretary Cheney in his Annual Report to the President and Congress in January 1990, the 
DMR identified the following “requirements” for reform:  
• Forge better links among national policy, military strategy, force structure, resources, 
and programs 
• Enhance programmatic and technical input during resource allocation discussions 
• Reduce significantly the number of programs that overrun their budgets, are late, or 
are technically deficient 
• Reduce overhead costs while maintaining military strength 
• Establish and enforce high ethical standards of conduct in the DoD and the defense 
industry 
• Reduce micromanagement and simplify the laws and regulations governing the DoD 
• Reverse the decline in the industrial base  
• Improve relations among Congress, DoD, and the defense industry10  
The need for these reforms was attributed to “competing national priorities” and the 
decline of financial resources available for national defense.  
The goals laid out by the DoD require a long-term strategy, because true solutions for 
these problems could not come in the form of “‘quick fixes’ or simple statements of 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (1986, February 28) 
10 Cheney (1990, January) 
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 managerial philosophy.”11  To change management culture and accomplish its goals, the DoD 
turned to the private sector for examples; the Annual Report explained, “the DMR 
recommended that the Department heed the lessons learned by many large private firms 
which, when faced with management problems and organizational ‘symptoms’ comparable 
to DoD’s, were able to overcome their problems and realize dramatic, simultaneous 
productivity improvements and cost reduction.”12   
The Office of the Secretary of Defense sought to consolidate certain practices and 
delegate functions that did not need high-level attention to the respective departments.  For 
instance, finance and accounting was centralized in the new Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS) and a consolidated revolving fund, the Defense Business Operating Fund 
(DBOF), was created.  In the services, the Army used its PPBS system to initiate cost-saving 
changes; the Navy implemented over sixty cost-reducing measures through streamlined 
management practices; and the Air Force streamlined and “flattened” its organizational 
structure. At the end of the Bush (41) Administration, Secretary of Defense Cheney felt that 
these DMR efficiencies would result in savings totaling $70 billion by FY 1997.13   
Clinton Administration (1993-2001): “Transforming the DoD for 
the 21st Century” 
“Change is difficult. But nowhere is the need for change more obvious then on the business side of 
defense.”  
—DoD Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1999 
The Clinton Administration had a management reform agenda driven by Vice 
President Al Gore.  The National Performance Review (NPR), later renamed The National 
Partnership for Reinvention, was created in 1993 to spearhead the effort. The stated “goal is 
to make the entire federal government less expensive and more efficient, and to change the 
culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative 
                                                 




 and empowerment.”14  Characteristics of reinvention included information technology 
integration, cutting cost, streamlining processes, improving customer service, and 
experimentation. The DoD created study teams to access weaknesses and provide 
recommendations on their change implementation strategy.15  
During Secretary Aspin’s short tenure as Secretary of Defense, the Administration 
focused on cost reduction through the use of dual-technology to support the “two pillars of 
military capability and economic strength.”16  Once again, the Administration pointed to 
technological advances in the private sector and the need for the DoD to do the same. During 
William Perry’s term in office, themes of cost reduction and “enhancing defense reform,” 
were continued.  The Annual Reports during Clinton’s first term were organized into the 
following sections: Personnel, Financial Management Reform, Acquisition Reform, 
Environmental Security, Infrastructure and Logistics, and Research and Technology. Each 
respective section lists management-improvement initiatives, cost-reduction successes, and 
suggestions for future development.17   
In 1998, the Administration implemented a “new” approach to defense management 
reform—transformation for the 21st Century—under Secretary of Defense William Cohen.  
Cohen argued that DoD management practices were far behind those found in the private 
sector. He wrote:  
DoD has labored under support systems and business practices that are at least a 
generation out of step with modern corporate America. DoD support systems and 
practices that were once state-of-the-art are now antiquated compared with the 
systems and practices in place in the corporate world, while other systems were 
developed in their own defense-unique culture and have never corresponded with the 
best business practices of the private sector.18
                                                 
14 Clinton (1993, January 3) 
15 Cohen (2001) 
16 Aspin (1994) 
17 Perry (1995) 
18 Cohen (1998) 
10 
 Although Cohen uses the phrase “best business practices,” he does not mention 
benchmarking these best business practices. However, President Clinton had urged federal 
agencies to benchmark best practices in the private sector. In Executive Order 12862, Clinton 
urged agencies to “benchmark customer service performance against the best in the 
industry.19   
Transformation in the DoD for the 21st Century proposed three main initiatives for 
change: the Defense Reform Initiative, the Management Reform Memoranda, and the DoD 
Acquisition Year 2000 goals. First, on November 10, 1997, Cohen announced the Defense 
Reform Initiative (which he refers to in 1999 as a “strategic blueprint”) to make the DoD 
“leaner and more flexible in order to remain competitive.”20  This plan proposed four major 
initiatives:  
• Reengineer: Adopt modern business practices to achieve world-class standards of 
performance. 
• Consolidate: Streamline organizations to remove redundancy and maximize synergy. 
• Compete: Apply market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and respond to 
customer needs.  
• Eliminate: Reduce excess support structures to free resources and focus on core 
competencies.21  
Next, the Management Reform Memoranda proposed 17 reform measures to 
streamline the infrastructure and “reengineer” business processes, such as acquisition, 
education, information sharing, transportation, travel, and facilities and property 
management.22  Rather than change incrementally, Cohen seemed to argue for big change 
through reengineering. Nevertheless, the focus of defense management reform was again on 
efficiency, cost reduction, flexibility, and excellence—starting at the highest level and 
moving into the departments.   
                                                 
19 Clinton (1993, September 11) 




 George W. Bush Administration (2001-Present): “Better 
Enterprise for Better Support” 
“It is not, in the end, about business practices, nor is it the goal to improve figures on the bottom line. 
It’s about the security of the United States of America. And let there be no mistake, it is a matter of life 
and death. Our job is defending America, and if we cannot change the way we do business then we 
cannot do our job well, and we must.” 
—Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks September 10, 2001 
The George W. Bush Administration also came to office with a management focus. 
The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) addresses five areas targeted for management 
reform throughout the federal government: human capital, improved financial management, 
competitive sourcing, electronic government, and budget and performance integration.23   
 DoD’s initial management objective was to “increase effectiveness through increased 
accountability and efficiency”24 with emphasis on cost reduction, improving quality, reducing 
redundancies, and adopting best business practices.  Although reengineering as a business 
change method is outdated, some of the language remains behind.  The 2002 Annual Report 
calls for realigning, restructuring, streamlining, and focusing on core functions. Additionally, 
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that “DoD's business processes and regulations 
seem to be engineered to prevent any mistake.”25 Change was driven by the newly created 
Business Practices Implementation Board, an advisory panel consisting of private-sector 
executives, and other senior-level management reform committees. Later, the Department’s 
Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) and Defense Business 
Transformation Agency (DBTA) were created to institutionalize parts of the DoD change 
program. In addition, the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) “is the enterprise 
architecture for the Department of Defense’s business information infrastructure processes, 
data, standards, business rules, operating requirements, and information exchanges.”26  The 
BEA seeks to add uniformity to DoD processes to “ensure accurate, reliable, timely and 
compliant information” and also streamline activities.  
                                                 




 This brief history clearly illustrates that Sea Enterprise is building on a foundation of 
recent management reform initiatives that targeted many of the same objectives. Constant 
themes of recent management reforms include: culture change, streamlining processes and 
organization, and managing overhead and direct costs, all to improve readiness and quality to 
better support warfighters.  Internal and external budget pressures have been the reasons cited 
for some of these reform agendas; even the term “transformation” has been previously 
applied. 
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 III. Business Management Transformation in the DoD, 
Army and Air Force 
This section reviews business transformation in the DoD, the Army, and the Air 
Force.  It identifies both similarities and differences in definitions of, rationales for, 
philosophies about, and implementation of business transformation among the DoD and the 
two sister services.  Ultimately, this review can serve as a basis for comparing the approaches 
of the Navy and its sister services in meeting the challenges of transforming business 
practices. 
Transformation: What It Is 
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines transformation as “a process that shapes 
the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of 
concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and 
protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps 
underpin peace and stability in the world.”27  In the DoD’s view, transformation is a never-
ending process of continually anticipating and adapting to the future, with an ultimate goal of 
sustaining US competitive advantage in warfare.28    
The DoD’s transformation efforts are designed to achieve two related goals: to create 
“the future of warfare” and to improve its business practices.  This second goal, the 
improvement of business practices, is especially important, because the DoD must create this 
“future of warfare” within expected resource constraints.29  Specifically, the DoD’s business 
transformation seeks to improve support to the warfighter while simultaneously ensuring 
                                                 
27 Director, Force Transformation (Fall 2003, p. 8) 
28 Ibid. 
29 www.gao.gov (2006, July 31) 
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 financial accountability within the DoD and its component services30 and among coalition 
partners.31  
The Army’s definition of transformation is virtually identical to the DoD’s. Likewise, 
the Army’s implementation actions support the DoD’s definition in terms of using a process, 
developing new combinations of capabilities and responding to a changing nature of warfare 
and the joint/combined environment.  The Air Force’s definition of transformation, while not 
as verbatim as the Army’s, is nonetheless conceptually very similar to the DoD’s.  
Specifically, the Air Force defines transformation as “[a] process by which the military 
achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organization, 
and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or ability to meet 
the demands of a changing security environment.”32  Interestingly, the Air Force definition 
can be construed as placing the Air Force’s current activities within a stream of 
transformation that has existed since the dawn of the service; in a sense, the Air Force might 
argue it has always been “transforming.”   
Rationale for Transformation 
The DoD’s transformation agenda is motivated by a turbulent environment that 
includes new and unpredictable threats.  As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 
Richard Myers noted, “The transformation of the United States military (today) is to get us 
ready for what’s around the next corner […] [a]nd this is difficult, because we don’t know 
what’s around the next corner.”33  While uncertain about the specific threats, the DoD is far 
more certain that its existing force structure is inadequate to meet them. 
Along with creating the “future of warfare,” the DoD understands its business 
management function must also change to keep pace with an evolving environment.34  
                                                 
30 Department of Defense, Business Transformational Guidance (2006, June 21) 
31 Director, Force Transformation (Fall 2003, p. 8) 
32 US Air Force (2004, p. 8)   
33 Garamone (2005, March 21) 
34 Department of Defense, BTG (2006, June 21) 
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 Simply, the DoD needs more bang from what is all too likely to be limited bucks.  To 
improve its efficiency, the DoD must tackle several significant challenges: too many silos 
and layers impede efficiency; implicit management beliefs such as “get the money and spend 
the money” (or “use it or lose it”) and “plug and pray” lead to suboptimal weapon 
acquisitions; and finally, greater integration among the services will be critical in an era of 
constrained resources.35    
Along with the DoD generally, both the Army and the Air Force are transforming in 
response to changing world events.  During the Cold War, the Army’s plans centered on 
employing large units with heavy equipment to defeat the Soviet Union, likely on continental 
Europe.  Unfortunately, the fall of the Soviet Union left the Army unprepared.  The Army 
“had a cold war infrastructure, a cold war worldwide footprint for the last 60 years.”36  
Similarly, a great debate is raging over the Air Force’s role in future combat operations.  
While many in the Air Force believe that air power alone can defeat or at least stalemate 
enemy ground forces (e.g., “Rapid Halt” operations), many other analysts maintain that only 
ground forces can capture and control enemy territory and forces.37  Changing circumstances 
have forced each service to transform itself appropriately to the new global environment. 
Philosophy of Transformation 
The DoD views transformation as an ongoing process without an endpoint or 
deadline.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argues, “the goal is not to transform the entire US 
military in one year, or even in one decade. That would be both unnecessary and unwise. 
Transforming the military is not an event; it is an ongoing process. There will be no point at 
which we can declare that US forces have been ‘transformed.’”38   
Despite the apparent lack of an endstate or a deadline, both the DoD and others have, 
nonetheless, attempted to categorize transformational efforts in terms of time horizons; these 
                                                 
35 www.gao.gov/cghome/dia (2006, July 31) 
36 Peters (2005, September 1) 
37 “Rapid Halt Operations” did not appear as a CONOP in the 2004 AFTFP. 
38 Rumsfeld (2002, May-June); DoD (2003, April) 
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 categorizations offer some helpful insights.  Transformation can be classified, for example, 
as near-term (less than five years), mid-range (ten years) or long-range (potentially 20 years 
or longer).  Shorter-term transformations are more limited and tend to rely on existing 
technologies, while long-range transformations can effect “radical” changes.  Importantly, 
investments in short- and mid-range transformations can serve as a barrier to long-range 
transformation by locking up resources that could better be leveraged toward truly strategic 
needs.39  Thus, careful trade analysis is critical in allocating fixed resources between shorter-
term operational needs, mid-range transformations, and long-term radical transformational 
efforts. 
Along with having a longer (even indefinite) time frame, the DoD also views its 
transformation as inherently cultural.  It seeks to encourage a shift within the DoD (and 
component services) to an entrepreneurial culture of “creativity and intelligent risk-taking.”  
Secretary Rumsfeld argues the DoD “must promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one 
that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like bureaucrats and 
more like venture capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be ‘validated’ 
but rather anticipates them before they appear and develops new capabilities to dissuade and 
deter them.40  
For several reasons—e.g., the importance of the task, the constrained resources, and 
the lengthy time-horizon involved—integrating the transformational efforts of the DoD and 
the services is particularly important.  Most transformational efforts will be at the service 
level; each service manages its own appropriations and acquisitions with its own business 
practices.  Careful management is vital to ensure that transformation at the service level does 
not suboptimize transformation across the entire DoD.41  
On the surface, the Army’s philosophy of transformation appears similar to that of the 
DoD and the other services.  The Army’s stated understanding is that transformation is a 
                                                 
39 DoD (2003, April); Binnendijk & Kugler (2001, November) 
40 Rumsfeld (2002, May-June, pp. 20-32) 
41 www.dod.mil/dbt/mission; Cebrowski 
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 continual process; however, their primary goal is a mid-range target of transforming their 
Cold-war structure to a more modular one by no later than 2014.42  This focus can be 
explained, perhaps, in that the Army arguably had the largest reorientation to complete in 
shifting from the Cold War force structure.  On the other hand, the Army does understand the 
importance of cultural change to successful transformation.  The Army wants to increase the 
speed of innovation in what they believe to be an already existing culture of innovation.43     
The Army has also recognized the importance of transforming its business activities 
to better support their operational transformation efforts.  They are instilling a culture of 
continuous process improvement throughout the Army’s business environment to increase 
responsiveness, decrease cycle-time, decrease inventories and provide enhanced support.  
Army business transformation efforts will reduce human and financial resources that can be 
directed towards supporting operational requirements.44  
Similarly to the Army, and in accordance with the DoD, the Air Force also 
understands transformation to be more philosophical and not tied to a specific deliverable, 
end-state, or deadline.  Interestingly, however, while they appreciate transformation is a 
philosophical mindset, Air Force leaders note that although they are pleased with the Air 
Force’s progress to date in transforming itself, the Air Force transformation is not yet 
complete.  
Approach to Transformation 
The DoD has identified six major, strategic, high-leverage initiatives, called Business 
Enterprise Priorities (BEPs), which it believes will have the greatest impact on the DoD 
business arm.  These BEPs include achieving better visibility into personnel, acquisitions, 
materiel, and finances, as well as common supplier engagement and real property 
                                                 
42 US Army (2004) 
43 Department of the Army (2005b) 
44 Ibid. 
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 accountability.45  To achieve these and other transformation goals, the DoD is faced with two 
major challenges in transformation.   
DoD’s first challenge is that it must balance near-term and long-range investment 
risks.46   As noted earlier, short-term investment can be the enemy of long-range 
transformation.  On the other hand, long-range investments are not helpful in maintaining 
current operational superiority.  Fortunately, some see a way around the tough decisions over 
allocating scarce resources between short-term operational and long-term transformation 
needs, suggesting that the short-term operational requirements might even support longer-
term transformational efforts.  For example, many fear the long-term effects of the war in 
Iraq on transformation, especially the risk that the war will rob funding from transformation 
efforts.   Others, however, mount a counterargument that the war in Iraq is actually 
accelerating transformation efforts.47   
The DoD’s second challenge is that it must commit funds to specific transformational 
initiatives while acknowledging that better options might become available. The Department 
must be willing to cut resources committed to programs—even reasonably-performing 
transformation initiatives—when better options present themselves.48    
Given resource constraints and current operations tempos, the DoD accepts that 
transforming the entire force is, at least initially, not feasible.  Continuous improvement is 
thus the “bread and butter” of transformation—an approach that drives small, consistent 
improvements in everything the DoD does.49  Beyond continuous improvement come mid-
range commitments and targeted long-range “big bets” designed to effect radical 
                                                 
45 www.dod.mil/dbt/priorities 
46 Department of Defense (2003, April) 
47 Morris, 2004, August 4   
48 Department of Defense (2003, April) 
49 Ibid. 
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 transformation.50 Because it is the “bread and butter” of transformation, both the Army and 
the Air Force have adopted techniques to drive continuous improvement. 
In the Army, Lean Six Sigma is the tool of choice to drive across-the-board 
elimination of unnecessary or wasteful processes, the reduction of process variability, and the 
improvement of quality.51  The Army has set an initial goal to identify at least $2.5 billion 
from FY2007 onward through improvements in cycle-time reduction and output quality 
improvement.52  The Army has committed to extensive training in Lean Six Sigma, including 
the well-known “belts” system drawn from the martial arts.  All program personnel will 
receive familiarization training, and higher-level “belts,” symbolizing greater levels of 
training and experience, will be required in critical operational and headquarters positions.53   
Although it is the foundational tool for improvement across the Army, consistent with 
the DoD’s “bread and butter” approach to transformation, Lean Six Sigma is viewed as a 
supplement to the Army’s ongoing efforts to transform its business operations through 
initiatives such as: Personnel Transformation, Business Management Modernization 
Program, Portfolio Management of Business Information Systems, Balanced Scorecard, 
Logistics Transformation and Institutional Army Adaptation.54  The Army also seeks deeper 
levels of learning and change.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned, for example, gathers 
operational data and conduct studies that can help direct the efforts towards the Future 
Force.55   
The Air Force is also trying to balance near- and longer-term transformational efforts 
with current operational needs.  Air Force leadership argues the Air Force is pursuing 
transformation programs as aggressively as budgets permit.  Current readiness shortfalls 
make Air Force modernization a tangible and high priority, which, they argue, should not be 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 US Army. About continuous process improvement 
52 Secretary of the Army 
53 Department of the Army (2005a) 
54 Secretary of the Army 
55 US Army (2004) 
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 sacrificed for transformation programs with distant and uncertain payoffs.  If DoD mandates 
both goals, Air Force leaders believe greater funding will be needed to achieve both urgent, 
high-priority modernization and longer-term transformation.56  
Perhaps convinced that this greater funding might be inconsistent with the realities of 
projected resource constraints, the Air Force has also adopted tools such as Lean Six Sigma 
to drive efficiencies.  The USAF intends to create new processes through its Smart Ops 21 
program, the implementation of which was facilitated by the Air Force’s mandate to reduce 
its force by approximately 40,000 active duty personnel.  Smart Ops 21 encompasses the 
improvement tools of Lean, Six Sigma and Theory of Constraints.  To Air Force leaders, 
Smart Ops 21 is not a program; rather, it is a way of thinking that encourages airmen to 
question current process and develop more efficient and effective replacements.  Ultimately, 
Air Force leadership wants to use Smart Ops 21 to initiate a cultural change across the Air 
Force.57   
Summary 
The DoD and its component services are transforming in response to a changing 
environment and a resource stream expected to continue constrained in the foreseeable 
future.  While both the Army and the Air Force have undertaken efforts that they argue are 
long-term and radically transformational, especially in response to questions about the 
relevancy of their Cold War structure to modern combat environments, it appears that both 
services are acting in concert with the DoD’s “bread and butter” approach (and consistently 
with the Navy’s efficiency/cost-savings focus), in which the dominant form of transformation 
is incremental improvement designed to wring efficiencies from the system and allow “cash 
spin” of the savings to fund additional priorities.  
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 IV. Managing Organizational Change 
Industry faces significant issues in developing transformation strategies.  These 
include many-faceted shareholder and customer demands, globalization, a complex 
government regulatory structure, the rapid evolution of technology, and persistent pressures 
to manage costs.  Defense management faces many similar challenges.  What, then, does the 
business literature about organizational change say that can help the Navy understand and 
manage its Sea Enterprise change initiative?  This chapter looks at the literature on 
organizational change to identify (1) relevant themes in models of organizational change and 
(2) strategies for implementing change.  
Literature on organizational change and transformation falls into three major 
categories: the academic, the quasi-academic, and the prescriptive.  Academic works found 
in scholarly publications, such as Journal of Management or the Academy of Management 
Review, tend to be theoretical and focus mainly on modeling external or internal factors of 
organizational changes.  There is little on the prescriptive questions of how an organization 
can accomplish change, which kinds of change to pursue, and the steps to get there. Quasi-
academic publications, such as Harvard Business Review and Sloan Management Journal, 
attempt to combine academic approaches with prescriptive advice to managers.  The purely 
prescriptive “guru” literature consists mostly of advice from business leaders or consultants. 
These tend to be focused on broad principles illustrated with anecdotes from business 
organizations.   
Themes in Models of Organizational Change 
At least two categories of general themes are found in the literature, theories that 
model organizational change.  One theme addresses questions of the timing and scope of 
change; the second deals with types of change. 
Timing and Scope 
The timing and scope of change initiatives is influenced by issues of urgency and 
demands of the organization. One approach is to consider first- and second-order changes. 
First-order change can involve adjustments within the existing structure, or doing more or 
23 
 less of something.  First-order change is reversible, does not involve new learning and is non-
transformational.  Second-order change requires a new way of seeing things and 
transformation to something quite different.  It requires new learning and is irreversible.58  
Second-order change seems to be what Sea Enterprise is driving toward as it speaks of a new 
culture, a new way of doing things and a break from past practices. 
A key early question is whether change is best done comprehensively or piecemeal. 
One researcher explains:   
Although theorists of revolutionary change have advocated that all 
organizational elements, such as strategy, structures, people, systems, and 
culture, have to be changed simultaneously to achieve maximum 
organizational alignment and effectiveness, closer field examination done in 
finer time intervals suggests that the realization of many such changes is 
fraught with difficulties and typically takes several years. Different contexts 
may require different assumptions about time.59
Implicitly, the assumption often seems to be that most change is going to be 
incremental and take a long time, especially in the absence of a major crisis. Many 
government reforms in the past have tended to be piecemeal—for instance, in the reinvention 
initiative of the 1990s, during which departments were encouraged to experiment with new 
management strategies; and although experiments were carried out, no comprehensive 
radical change plans were implemented throughout any departments.60  Sea Enterprise 
defines its view of transformation as “deep change […] change that is major in scope, 
discontinuous with the past and generally irreversible.”61  
A second fundamental issue is whether change should be viewed as episodic or 
continuous. A basic episodic change model is based on Lewin’s concept of “unfreeze—
transition—freeze.” This change model assumes that organizations will go through 
distinctive intermittent periods of change.  Here, the organization confronts a need to change, 
                                                 
58 Golumbiewski, Billingsly & Yeager (1979); Bateson (1979); Berquist (1993) 
59 Huy (2001, October) 
60 Ingraham, Thompson & Sanders (1998) 
61 Quinn (1996) 
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 “unfreezes” in order to position for change, transitions to new mode changing structure, 
processes, or culture, and then “freezes” to operate in that new mode until and unless some 
new condition drives another change cycle. The problems with this type of change are 
apparent. “Episodic change tends to be infrequent, slower because of its wide scope, less 
complete because it is seldom fully implemented, more strategic in its content, more 
deliberate and formal than altered, and initiated at higher levels in the organization.” Such 
changes are usually in the face of crisis, involve drastic actions, and have low success rates.62    
Continuous change, on the other hand, includes improvisation, translation, and 
learning.63 Organizations involved in continuous change are those that are built be flexible to 
change.  Continuously changing organizations are in a constant mode of translating their 
environment, improvising to circumstances, and learning.  One continuous change model 
restates Lewin’s episodic model to “freeze, rebalance, unfreeze.”   The organization 
“freezes” when something new arises in the environment, rebalances itself to meet the threat 
or opportunity, and, finally, “unfreezes” by becoming flexible and open to continuous 
change.  
Some change models for large organizations suggest what has come to be known to 
some as “intrapreneurship.”64  Brown and Eisenhardt describe an organizational model of 
continuous change utilizing semi-structures—organizations in which some features are 
prescribed, but other aspects are not—leaving the firm with the ability to do its core task as 
well as having the flexibility to improvise.65  Similarly, Tushman and O’Reilly assert that 
organizations need to become ambidextrous, separating units for exploring new opportunities 
from those involved in older traditional operations—thus allowing for innovative new 
independent organizations maintained tightly at the senior management level.66  
                                                 
62 Weick & Quinn (1999) 
63 Ibid. 
64 Eesley & Longenecker (2006, January/February) 
65 Brown & Eisenhardt (1997, March) 
66 Tushman & O’Reilly (2004, April) 
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 Christensen’s suggestion is to create separate units within the company, and to exploit 
smaller markets, which can be excited with small gains.67   
Sea Enterprise would seem to be embracing some elements of many of these models.  
There are elements of comprehensive change suggested by the simultaneous transformation 
of both the warfighting force and the business management of the Navy.  On the other hand, 
the goal seems to be to create an organization that remains flexible and open to continuous 
change. 
Types of Change 
Change initiatives can address various types of change.  Two types most relevant to 
the Sea Enterprise initiative are process change and culture change.  Change programs can 
focus on changing process and structure, cultural change, or both. Beer and Nohria call this 
“hard” versus “soft” change or “Theory E” and “Theory O” types of change.68  The “hard” 
(or Theory E) approach to change usually takes the form of process and structural change—
moving people, subtracting or adding offices, changing the architect of the organization.  
Cultural change involves changing the motivations, attitudes, and the goals of the workers.  
Huy breaks down these types of changes even further into: commanding, engineering, 
teaching, and socializing.  Commanding and engineering are “hard” types of change; with 
engineering focusing on internal processes and commanding focused on directing people to 
change. Teaching and socializing constitute “soft” change: teaching new behavior and 
attitudes and socializing to creating a new environment. Ultimately, organizations may go 
through more than one type of change over time, sometimes doing two or more 
simultaneously.69  
Sea Enterprise seems to be encouraging both Theory E and Theory O type changes.  
While there is a major focus on culture change, there are also proposals for structural change 
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68 Beer & Nohria (2000, May/June) 
69 Huy (2001, October) 
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 in the enterprise, and subordinate commands are instituting process changes to achieve 
efficiencies. 
Process and Structural Change.  There is more literature on process and structural 
change than on culture change.  In general, process change programs, “share a core focus on 
measuring, improving, and rationalizing processes […] to increase yield and reduce rework 
and waste as streamlined processes eliminate non-value added activities.”70  There are 
numerous process and structure change programs.  The following are some current trends.   
Less management and more employee empowerment:  In 1988, Peter Drucker 
predicted that in twenty years, large organizations would have less management and 
resemble the structure of hospitals, symphony orchestras, and universities. “The typical 
business will be knowledge-based, an organization composed of specialists who direct and 
discipline their own performance through organized feedback from colleagues, customers, 
and headquarters.”71  Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector argue that most change programs focus on 
changing attitudes when the need is really to reshape the roles that people play.  They 
propose that organizations use “task alignment— reorganizing roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships to solve specific business problem” as the focal point of a change program.72   
Networks  Network reforms aim to create virtual organizations, networked 
organizations, and partnerships of different parts within a larger entity.  “Virtual 
organizations have been successful at creating flexibility, but the people working in them 
struggle with loss of proprietary knowledge and control.”73  There have been successes with 
networks in the federal government, but there have also been problems with employee 
morale.74
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 Womack and Jones suggest using lean manufacturing principles on the whole 
corporation instead of just certain segments, thus creating a “group of individuals, functions,” 
with the mission to “analyze and focus a value stream so that it does everything involved in 
supplying a good or service to the customer.”75  This is similar to the concepts of both 
“virtual corporations” and networks, but within one entity. Yet, Kotter warns against 
interdependence because too much interdependence tends to stifle change. He suggests 
finding and eliminating unnecessary interdependences.76
Teams: Other forms of achieving less management come in term of teams. Cross-
organizational teams, for instance, involve different people with different roles working on 
one product. A more horizontal organization suggests greater organizational democracy.  
“There is no question that we are in the participative era of management and leadership.”77  
These approaches do not mean looser systems of management. Spear and Bowen, when 
discussing the Toyota Production System, point out that their rigid system gives lower-level 
employees more responsibility:  
By making people capable and responsible for doing and improving their own 
work, by standardizing connections with customers and suppliers, and by 
pushing the resolution of connection and flow problems to the lowest possible 
level, the rules create an organization with a nest modular structure, rather like 
the traditional Russian dolls that come one inside the other.  The great benefit 
of nested, modular organizations is that people can implement design changes 
in one part without unduly affecting another. That’s why managers at Toyota 
can delegate so much responsibility without creating chaos.78
Most process improvements work on a particular aspect of the operation rather than 
on the whole.  The trend is toward technological-based systems like enterprise resource 
planning, supply-chain management, and customer-relationship management.  Six Sigma and 
Lean work on specific outcomes.  Hammer argues for “operational innovation,” coming up 
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 with a completely new approach to how a company operates, citing it as the reason for the 
success of Dell and Toyota.79
A different approach, offered by Schaffer and Thompson, asserts that process and 
structural change should be grounded in results.  They critique radical broad-based change.  
“Result-driven programs, on the other hand, rely on an incremental approach to change, 
building on what works and discarding what doesn’t.”80  Their steps to transformation are 
doing only what is needed, empirical testing of what works, frequent reinforcement, and 
continuous learning.   
Culture Change.  Notwithstanding the strength of process and structural change, some 
argue that culture should be the focal point for change.  Oxman and Smith assert that 
structural change is outdated, predicting cultural change that incorporates knowledge and 
performance management systems will replace structural change and reduce the current 
hierarchical makeup of corporations.81  Bass and Riggio state that organizational cultures are 
both the inhibitors and catalysts of change. Placing leadership as the most important 
component, they argue for creation of an informal, flexible, adaptive, and dynamic, or 
“transformational,” culture.82  
Other types of cultural change involve customer focus, quality focus, and being more 
innovation-minded.  These are common themes in the prescriptive literature.  However, 
cultural change rarely comes alone.  For instance, some change strategies will initiate 
structural changes to make an organization more customer-focused or quality-focused and, 
then, mention culture as a tool.  Kotter suggests that the only way to change culture is 
actually by changing structure; that changing people’s attitude can only come about by 
changing their actions.83
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 Appreciative inquiry (AI) can be used to approach cultural change. Rejecting the 
traditional diagnostic, problem-solving approach, organizations applying AI look at what is, 
or has been going well, instead of what is going wrong.  “AI is typically thought of as a ‘soft’ 
strategy used in creating organizational visions, aligning groups, and building cultures.”84  It 
can also fit into strategy formulation.  Typically, AI is composed of four steps: 1) discover: 
find what is going well; 2) dream: imagine what perfect would be; 3) design: define what 
would be in the perfect structure, process, etc.; and 4) destiny: creating. There have been 
positive results with AI.85  
There are limitations to both hard and soft approaches.  Beer and Nohria point out 
that CEOs focusing solely on “hard” change will “distance themselves from their employees 
to ease their own pain and guilt.”  “They fail to invest in building the company’s human 
resources, which inevitably hollows out the company and saps its capacity for sustained 
performance.” On the other hand, focusing solely on “soft” change can prevent CEOs from 
making tough decisions.  Beer and Nohria recommend a balanced approach using both “soft” 
and “hard” changes.86  Others call for a simultaneous approach. “Organizational cultures are 
continuously constructed and reconstructed through interaction and intervention at the 
everyday level: they are constantly ‘in progress’ and largely resist central control.”87
Sea Enterprise is clearly involved in changing—both process/structurally and 
culturally.  Enterprise realignment efforts are addressing process and structure issues.  At the 
same time, Sea Enterprise strives to create a new culture of cost consciousness, enterprise-
wide thinking, and continuous improvement.  
Strategies for Implementing Change 
The development of implementation strategies for change invites the question of 
whether it is necessary to match the different types of change, as discussed above, with 
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 different and/or matching forms of implementation. This is a problem area in the literature. 
Some overriding questions seem to be, “If you have different forms of change, must you 
utilize implementation strategies that match? Is there a different form of implementation that 
works better or is more closely aligned with hard or soft change, for example?”  A lot of deep 
change is soft.  Organizations may want outcomes associated with processes that are soft but 
want processes that are all hard.  As will be discussed later in this text, Sea Enterprise 
appears to embrace both hard and soft types of change. 
The implementation part of change management is addressed mostly in the 
prescriptive literature.  Quinn, in Deep Change, says the seeds of transformation are a vision 
or new perspective, risk taking, experimentation, and learning from that experimentation, 
leading ultimately to innovation in thinking and practice. These seeds help create a dynamic 
organizational system in which transformation results from a number of closely connected 
operational and management innovations that represent marked departures from traditional 
principles, programs, and practices. For innovation to take hold and generate long-lasting 
advantage it must:  
• Solve or help solve a big management problem that challenges current thinking and 
practice 
• Challenge an existing belief that is the rationale for current (e.g., routine and habitual) 
management or operational practices and processes   
• Alter and be altered by existing organizational systems (e.g., reward, financial 
control, work design, etc.) to insure alignment among resources, tasks, technologies, 
structures, and processes (financial management, measurement, and controls as well 
as human resources).88  
Likewise, Roberto has a four-step model for approaching change89; Kotter has an 
eight-step model that has been adopted by Sea Enterprise to guide its change strategy and 
implementation program.90   
1. Establish a sense of urgency 
2. Create a guiding coalition  
                                                 
88 Quinn (1996) 
89 Roberto (2005, Summer) 
90 Kotter (1996)   
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 3. Develop a vision and strategy  
4. Communicate the vision  
5. Empower broad access 
6. Generate short-term wins 
7. Consolidate and expand the change effort 
8. Anchor new approaches 
In addition, Sea Enterprise has also identified a similar set of principles learned from 
its experience.91
• Drive transformation from the top 
• Understand your business 
• Develop a plan 
• Align structures and processes 
• Embrace best practices 
• Operationalize the plan 
• Create a culture of continuous improvement 
The need to create a crisis is prevalent in most prescriptive literature.92  Schein points 
out that “all forms of learning and change start with some form of dissatisfaction or 
frustration generated by data that disconfirm our expectations or hopes.”93  Labovitz and 
Rosansky look at the US military for an analogy: operating in peacetime, complacent and 
inefficient, but with fast-paced and efficient operations in wartime.94  Martin, however, offers 
a word of caution, “People in corporate crisis are in no frame of mind to learn new facts of 
life, which is just what they need to do.”95   
Leadership qualities are widely addressed in the prescriptive literature, with frequent 
examples from General Electric and WalMart, among others. But large organizational change 
rarely results from the leadership traits of a single individual.  Instead, some authors stress 
the necessity of forming teams and building coalitions. Duck calls for a, “Transition 
Management Team, whose members commit all their time and energy to managing change” 
                                                 
91 McCarthy (2006, August 8) 
92 Kotter (1996); Gansler & Lucyshyn (2005, Winter) 
93 Schein (1999, August) 
94 Labovitz & Rosansky (1997) 
95 Martin (1998) 
32 
 and that can connect the different elements of change efforts.96   Key roles are played by both 
leaders and top-level management97 and by middle managers.98  Going deeper in the 
organization than top-level management can expose differing opinions and contention that 
can serve to, “jump start the creative process.”99  Change does not always come from the top, 
but from general managers running peripheral plants and divisions.100  The role of top 
management in such cases is to recognize and foster leadership.  Sea Enterprise is aiming for 
an engaged leadership that: 
• Understands the true cost of their organizations/activities 
• Seeks continual improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
business operations 
• Delivers cost savings to the Navy.101 
An articulated mission or vision serves as a guiding principle for change. A vision can 
include both a statement of core ideology, values and purposes but can also portray an 
envisioned future and a vivid description of that envisioned future.102  Sea Enterprise has had 
a clearly articulated vision in the statements issued by CNOs Clark and Mullen.  Both have 
pointed to the mission and core values of the Navy and envisioned a modernized and 
recapitalized future Navy built in part from internally generated resources.  Quinn highlights 
the importance of good conversations—honest, imaginative, reasonable, inclusive, and issue 
oriented—in strategic planning.103
Developing a strategy can require diagnosing the problem(s) either bounded by 
limiting the scope104 or by diagnosing the whole company’s operation instead of fragments.105  
                                                 
96 Duck (1998) 
97 Bass & Riggio (2006); Tushman & O’Reilly (2004, April) 
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104 Roberto (2005, Summer) 
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 In assessing problems and developing change strategies, organizations sometimes turn to 
outside consultants or hire new leaders from outside the company or industry.  Consultants 
can give a better perspective on internal constraints.  Hiring an outsider CEO may have 
drawbacks, but it can also stir things up. Gansler and Lucyshyn surveyed thirty government, 
business, and academic leaders about business transformation in defense.  They proposed that 
the DoD obtain hiring authority to bring in “50 senior managers with necessary background 
and experience from the private sector” in order to facilitate DoD transformation.106   
Effective communication supports a change strategy, and organizations need to 
communicate the goals and vision of the change initiative. There are numerous factors to be 
addressed in communicating such messages. For example, Garnett suggests a rigorous 
analysis of four situational factors (Objectives, Audience, Management Situation, and 
Sender) and two strategy-design factors (Choice of media and Message) must be undertaken 
in order to communicate effectively.107  Additionally, many communication researchers 
highlight the role of persuasive and rhetorical strategies in promoting changes in attitude or 
behavior, noting that earlier “transmission” models of communication did not sufficiently 
account for the numerous factors that may affect interpretation and understanding.108   
Internal challenges to change, whether from employees or other managers, is to be 
expected and must be confronted. “Most contemporary theories of institutional change are 
characterized by an explanatory bias toward the status quo as well as by poorly specified 
mechanisms.”109  One approach is to view change as a “reframing” and differentiate between 
“true” reframing, which involves a change in root understanding, and paying lip service to, or 
simply “mouthing” a new perspective.110  While the term “transformation” has permeated the 
Navy and DoD in recent years, it can be more challenging to determine where true reframing 
is taking place and where new labels have been simply put onto existing practices. 
                                                 
106 Gansler & Lucyshyn (2005, Winter) 
107 Garnett (1992) 
108 See, for example, Conger (1991); Reardon (1991) 
109 Burns & Nielsen (2006, June) 
110 Argyris & Schon (1978) 
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 Sometimes resistance is an indicator of change initiative overload.  “Repetitive 
Change Syndrome” is experienced when organizations too frequently adopt change 
initiatives generating chaos, burnout, and incapacity to make further change—thus harming 
daily operations.111  “The true artistry of change management lies in the various kinds of 
tactics that change agents employ to create psychological safety.”112  Observers warn against 
adopting change initiatives too frequently.113  
One remedy for overcoming resistance is to seek early small wins.114  Small wins can 
energize employees or keep them excited about the change process.  It does the important job 
of showing that the change is working, especially if supported by effective communications. 
However, a lack of sustainable results can lead to management losing credibility,115 
detrimental effects to daily operations,116 and low morale.117  
It’s also vital to note that quick small wins may not result in permanent change; 
evaluation, feedback and communication are essential to sustaining change. It is likewise 
critical to judge whether change is actually working.  Doing so usually involves a metric 
system for stated goals (customer feedback, profits, efficiency, etc.).  
Collecting information, internally (employee attitudes, efficiency, quality, etc.) and 
externally (customer feedback, shareholder value) is used to gauge progress.  Such data must 
be comprehensible and relevant to a good change strategy. As an example, the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service and the Postal Service have had successes in implement the 
Balance Scorecard (BSC).118  BSC can be viewed as both a change program and change 
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 sustaining tool.  It has been one of the most popular feedback programs, along with Six 
Sigma and various quality assessment mechanisms.  
Rewarding is another key to maintaining change.119  This could be praising—awards, 
promotions, the belts system of Six Sigma—or monetary inducement.  Rewards can 
motivate, but they can also foster an unhealthy work environment. “Money can focus and 
motivate managers, but it can also hamper teamwork, commitment, and learning.” The 
solution is to tie incentives to commitment to change.120
Continuous learning can support change initiatives and overcome resistance.121  
Gansler and Lucyshyn’s survey report recommended transition to a knowledge-worker 
environment, where workers are able to develop, maintain, and use analytic support systems 
through further education and training.122  The literature recognizes that a lot of organizations 
cited as successful models of change do not sustain their success.  Therefore, to be 
continuously successful, organizations need to be adaptive, have employees that are always 
learning, and be flexible to change.  It now seems that the new goal is to build a flexible, 
continuously changing organization.  
As a business management change initiative, Sea Enterprise seems to be aimed at 
moving to this new type of organization.  A new approach to business management in the 
Navy is guided by core values and a vision, characterized by a focus on cost management 
and a reliance on a changed culture, and organized to support continuous change.  A 
transformational change process emerges where new value is created—shifting the focus so 
that all in the organization value the elements of the new vision and process.  Otherwise, 
change is not so much transformational as it is incremental within the exiting structure. 
Whether or not Sea Enterprise truly represents transformational change can be debated, but 
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 even if it represents continuous or incremental change, with both hard and soft elements, it is 
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 V. What is Benchmarking? 
How should N4 approach its ongoing transformation initiatives?  Is one approach 
appropriate for all transformational initiatives, or should the approach vary based on factors 
specific to the organization, the environment, or both?  These issues can be explored by 
examining what benchmarking is and how it is done.  Studying organizations that have 
successful transformation initiatives may reveal models for transformation and/or best 
practices. However, corporate organizational best practices may be embedded in unique 
cultures and contexts that hinder these practices’ transfer to the Navy. Examining public-
sector organizations at either the state or federal level (particularly in DoD) may also reveal 
pockets of innovation whose best practices are relevant to the Navy and, thus, have greater 
possibility for success. 
Organizations employ benchmarking as a management tool for searching out and 
implementing the best practices in the industry. When conducting preliminary research on 
whether or not to benchmark, organizations should be aware that there are few references 
regarding transformational change and/or organizational “agility” in the existing literature, 
and most literature remains practitioner-based.  Additionally, the benchmarking concept is 
“loosely connected to management theory and is the subject of disagreement between those 
who embrace it as a tool of performance improvement and good quality practice, and those 
who regard it as a fad or bandwagon.”123  The following chapter explores: 1) a general 
overview of benchmarking; 2) benchmarking typologies; 3) organizational readiness; 4) the 
processes involved in benchmarking; and 5) the future of benchmarking.   
An Overview 
There are multiple definitions for benchmarking.  Despite minor variations, each 
definition focuses primarily on a process of improvement. According to former Xerox 
executive Michael Spendolini, benchmarking is a “continuous, systematic process for 
evaluating the products, services, and work processes of organizations recognized as 
                                                 
123 Cox, Mann & Samson (1997) 
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 representing best practices for the purpose of organizational improvement.”124  Systems of 
measurement and improvement that led to the formation of the benchmarking process include 
competitive analysis and quality function deployment (QFD).125  Competitive analysis 
consists of collecting data regarding the markets, sales, products, production costs, etc., of 
various competitors for the purpose of comparison. Similarly, QFD, which originated within 
the Japanese Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in the 1970s, worked to improve product 
development in order to satisfy the expectations and needs of the customer. While both these 
forms of competitive comparison aimed to improve an organization’s output, they failed to 
examine and, in turn, implement the actual processes involved in improvement.126  
Prior to its application in the business world, surveyors used the term benchmark to 
compare land elevations. Later, the computer industry used the term “to mean a standard 
process for measuring the performance capabilities of software and hardware systems from 
various vendors.”127  The Xerox Corporation is the organization first credited with employing 
the benchmarking process in accordance with today’s standard business definition. The 
process, described by benchmarking pioneer Robert Camp, was adopted by Xerox in 1979 in 
order to compete effectively with their Japanese counterpart, Fuji-Xerox. Xerox leaders 
wanted insight into the manufacturing process employed by Fuji-Xerox, who sold their 
copiers at a much lower cost. A few years later, Xerox had the insight to look outside the 
industry for best practices, benchmarking their logistics operation against that of L.L. 
Bean.128  
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 Benchmarking Typologies 
Owing in part to a lack of theoretical framework, there are slight variations in the 
benchmarking classification schemes in the business literature.129  However, there are four 
generic themes that apply to all forms of benchmarking130:  
1) the value of learning from contexts outside an organization’s usual frame  
of reference 
2) the importance of undertaking this learning using a structured, formal approach 
3) the comparisons of practices between oneself and the best-in-class on a continuous 
basis 
4) the usefulness of information to drive actions for performance improvement.131 
Table 1 displays the various classifications of benchmarking found in the literature. 
The sections highlighted in green represent the most widely-accepted typologies, first 
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 Table 1. Benchmarking Classifications132
 
Organizational Readiness 
There are multiple reasons to benchmark. Benchmarking helps organizations set 
realistic goals, helps them raise their standards of operation to the best in the business, and 
opens an organization up to continuous improvement.133  Not surprisingly, benchmarking 
moved from the private sector into the public sector, and “although the public sector 
organization typically faces unique operational concerns and a strategic environment that 
differs from the private sector firm’s, public sector organizational goals and objectives are 
                                                 
132 Literature Sources of Table: The following classification scheme comes from a variety of sources. The term 
future benchmarking comes from Sarkis (2001) while the structure of the table, as well as the term global 
benchmarking, comes from Fong (1998). The classification headings (Type of Partner, Nature of the Object of 
Study, and Purpose of Partnership) are adaptations of Yamin (2002) and Fong (1998). 
133 Elmuti & Kathawala (1997) 
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 similar to those of the private sector.”134  In fact, there are multiple examples within the 
public sector of successful benchmarking practices. The US Armed Forces successfully 
benchmarked their recruiting efforts against those found in the private sector and produced 
the television spots seen by many today.135  Moreover, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) continually employs benchmarking to help Federal agencies reduce their costs and/or 
improve human capital work practices; over one hundred best practice reports are on their 
website. Finally, the federal government has encouraged benchmarking. On September 11, 
1993, Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12862 which called for government agencies to 
“benchmark customer service performance against the best in the industry.”136  
In addition to deciding whether or not to benchmark, organizations should determine 
their level of organizational readiness. According to former vice president of quality at 
Alcoa, Tim Carter, there are four phases that organizations involved in benchmarking go 
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 Table 2. Organizational Readiness 
 
Once an organization reaches the fourth phase, it is ready to begin the benchmarking 
process.  
Benchmarking Processes 
Organizations often adapt their own version of the benchmarking process to fit their 
needs. Despite the numerous processes in existence, they all share the following core ideas: 
planning, analysis, integration, and action.138  
Planning 
Most literature points to the planning stage as critical for successful benchmarking. 
This stage requires a complete understanding of the reality of the organization and a vision 
for where it needs to go. An organization must formulate a benchmarking “plan of attack,” 
conduct preliminary research, identify a benchmarking partner(s), research the legal and 
ethical issues involved with benchmarking, and create a benchmarking team. When 
immersed in this stage, Robert Camp asks the following of the organization: What is to be 
benchmarked? To whom or what will we compare? How will the data be collected?139
                                                 
138 Camp (1993); these core ideas are, at times, attributed to Edward Deming and the Deming Cycle 
139 Camp (1989) 
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 Analysis 
In this phase, the organization gathers and analyzes the respective data. This phase 
calls for a thorough self-understanding (gathered in the planning stage) in order to fully 
appreciate and learn from a comparison with the best in class. Although available software 
does aid in quantitative data collection and interpretation, an organization should also look to 
the qualitative data to understand the processes involved in improvement and the overarching 
systems at work within the organization.140  Numerical measures “don’t tell you how to 
improve.”141
Integration 
At this point in the benchmarking process, the organization must accept the results of 
the benchmark findings and carefully plan a method for implementing those best practices 
that fit the mission of the organization. Conclusions drawn from the analysis phase must be 
based on substantive data collection (both quantitative and qualitative) and not on the 
opinions of the organization’s leaders.  
Action  
Integration must translate to action. Those in charge of the respective areas in need of 
improvement should participate in creating a realistic method of integrating the plan.  
Effective communication is essential for success. All levels of management within an 
organization must understand all aspects of benchmarking and be updated regularly and 
thoroughly throughout the process. Secondly, benchmarking is ongoing, meaning an 
organization cannot expect to reach “world class” by benchmarking once. There must be 
room for continual improvement. Organizations should expect to benchmark a few times a 
decade.142 Thirdly, periodic measurement is necessary to guarantee success.  
Although benchmarking helps to reach the level of the “best in class,” it does not 
show an organization how to surpass these standards. Jim Collins talks about the Stockholm 
                                                 
140 For a general overview of systems thinking, look to Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline. 
141 Camp (1993) 
142 Camp suggests every three years. 
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 Paradox in his book, From Good to Great. The Stockholm Paradox stipulates that 
organizations must deal in “brutal facts” of reality while simultaneously looking toward the 
future. Benchmarking helps an organization look to the brutal facts of reality to create a 
“better tomorrow”143; but it does not show an organization how to surpass those standards. 
Benchmarking remains firmly rooted in the reality of today, even when considering the 
future. Finally, a “lot of people try to find companies that look very much like their own. 
There is some risk in that. There is a desire to copy what you see rather than understand and 
translate it. You can copy something without understanding it—but that’s a short road to 
disaster.”144   
The tables below depict various approaches to the benchmarking process: Table 3 
lists benchmarking successes and failures145; Table 4 the benchmarking model for the Xerox 
Corporation; and Table 5 the benchmarking model issued by the American Productivity and 
Quality Center. For more benchmarking models, refer to the available literature citations 
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Table 3. Benchmarking Successes and Failures 
 




 Table 5. Benchmarking Model: American Productivity and Quality Center 
 
The Future of Benchmarking 
As researchers conduct closer examinations of the benchmarking process, new 
classification schemes have arisen, including future benchmarking.146  Future benchmarking 
is “a type of benchmarking to be utilized as a forecasting technique in order to identify 
breakthroughs in the industry, which could eventually serve as benchmarks themselves; it is a 
tool for agility measurement.”147  Although current benchmarking practices allow an 
organization to “catch up” to current industry best practices, it does not show an organization 
how to surpass those practices.148  Sarkis argues benchmarking should allow for agility, or a 
state of being that allows an organization to compete amidst continuous change. Although 
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148 Camp (1993) 
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 future benchmarking usually refers to agility through technology, Sarkis states, “agility is a 
‘national vision’ concept […] agility can be benchmarked at the industry level and research 
institution level, to determine how well certain aspects of agility would work in various 
competitive industries.”149  In other words, future benchmarking, if it reaches its “synergistic 
potential,” promotes benchmarking change models against the best in the industry. 
Professors Kim Cameron and David Whetten also believe that benchmarking is the 
first step in creating readiness for change. They argue that benchmarking, “identifies a target 
of opportunity. […] The objective is to unfreeze people from reliance on past practice by 
learning that there may be a better way.”150  When attempting to foster organizational agility, 
Cameron et al. identify several types of benchmarking standards for comparison: 
1) Comparative Standards: Benchmarking current performance practices. 
2) Goal Standards: Comparing current performance to publicly stated goals. 
3) Improvement Standards: Comparing current performance with improvements 
made in the past. 
4) Ideal Standards: Comparing current performance with an idea or perfect standard. 
5) Stakeholder Expectations: Comparing current performance with the expectations 
of customers, employees, or other stakeholders.151 
The standards above deviate from the traditional uses of benchmarking; however, 
these standards do create opportunities for culture change within an organization and may 
carve a new direction for the future of benchmarking processes.  
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 VI. Benchmarking Candidates for Sea Enterprise 
The preceding chapters lead to the identification of possible benchmarking candidates 
for Sea Enterprise.  The following is an annotated selection of benchmarking candidates, 
with a chart (Table 6 in Appendix A) denoting the types of benchmarking suggested for each 
candidate, the particular aspect of change management that stands out for each candidate, and 
the relevant literature to consult for more information on each candidate.  
American Auto Industry: General Motors and Ford 
Giants in Transition:  
Ford and GM are two automakers with similar crises. Although Ford is in much better 
shape (they made a profit last year, whereas GM lost $10 billion), both companies are facing 
decreasing market share and costs that far exceed their main foreign competitor, Toyota.  In 
the face of disaster, both companies have recently instituted change programs.   
The similarities between these two programs are striking.  In 2002, Ford implemented 
a 3-point program:  
1. Redouble efforts to stem US retail share loss 
2. Trim excess manufacturing capacity 
3. Rejuvenate products with expressive styling and disciplined scheduling.  
In 2005, GM North America came out with a 4-point plan for turnaround: 
1. Product Excellence 
2. Revitalize sales and marketing strategy  
3. Accelerate cost reductions and quality improvement 
4. Address health-care burden 
Other than GM specifically mentioning their health-care burden (which Ford also 
seeks to reduce), the two programs appear identical. Both companies also carried out 
structural reduction, including plant closures and layoffs. The companies were also 
negotiating with the union in order to reduce benefits to lower company costs. Additionally, 
there were no drastic changes in Ford’s product design between 2002 and 2006; excess 
capacity was trimmed, but far short of the changes suggested in its goals. Market share did 
not improve, partly because of the unexpected drop in SUV sales. Even in the traditional 
strong truck and SUV market, Ford and GM were losing ground to foreign carmakers.   
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 The Problem:  
The underlying problem at Ford and GM seems to be three-fold.  
1) Structural Concerns:  Both GM and Ford have excess capacity.  There is a lot of 
waste in both capital equipment and labor, which both address through lay-offs and 
sell-offs.  
2) Lack of Innovation: Both companies were not built either structurally or culturally to 
innovate.  Four years ago, Ford articulated a desire to design cars with expressive 
styling.  In addition, the documentary “Who Killed the Electric Car?” showed that a 
decade ago GM had a technology that could possibly revolutionize the industry and 
make it into a market leader in energy-efficient cars.  Instead, GM scrapped the 
project despite promising numbers.  Now, it is trying to catch up with Japanese 
carmakers in a segment it should have dominated.  Both examples demonstrate that 
Ford and GM have problem coming up with, accepting, and implementing new ideas.    
3) Poor Environment Conditions:  Ford and GM do not have the same reputation for 
quality among consumers as Toyota.  Also, the labor situation weighs down both 
companies. Pension and health care costs for Ford are almost four times higher per 
car than at Toyota (and GM shows costs 8 times higher!). Larry Bossidy, former 
Honeywell International CEO and respected business guru, said the situation makes it 
impossible to succeed, and the only solution might be government intervention to 
pick up pension and health care costs.    
Conclusion:  
Whether Ford and/or GM can turn around is yet to be seen.  Both companies face 
huge obstacles, internally and externally.  But their need for cost management, cost reduction 
and restructuring could be analogous to the situation facing the Navy and the DoD.152  
British Airways (BA) 
 
British Airways faced a huge financial crisis in the 1980s, which forced the company 
to privatize.  BA changed their slogan to “Putting People First” and implemented a new 
employee training program, essentially transitioning into a customer-focused airline 
company.  In doing so, BA garnered growth and respect in the industry.  Throughout the 
years, BA worked diligently to reinforce this mission to their employees, especially when the 
company cut functions to save money, which created loss of morale and a drop in customer 
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 service quality. Today, BA strives to reduce costs while simultaneously maintaining 
customer service quality, despite current airline trends that cut costs at the expense of their 
customer service programs.153  
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
 
DICE:  
The Boston Consulting Group developed DICE to analyze change efforts in 
organizations. DICE remains one of the few evaluation programs based on change alone. 
DICE has four components: 
1) Duration: Involves scheduling a milestone to review the execution of projects, 
identify gaps, and detect new risks.   
2) Integrity: Assesses how much a company can rely on team managers, supervisors, 
and staff to execute change.  
3) Commitment: Measures top-level commitment, as well the local area undergoing the 
change. 
4) Effort: Recognizes that additional work is necessary. Companies frequently do not 
realize that, with change programs, employees have to do additional work on top of 
their preexisting duties.  Assessing how much workload is added, ideally no more 
than 10% per employee, is crucial. 
BCG measures each component on a 7 (best) to 28 (worst) scale. A continuous 
measurement process used during a change effort, DICE increases effectiveness and 
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 Coca-Cola Enterprises 
 
Business to Employee (B2E):  
Coca Cola created one of the most advanced online marketplaces for its employees. 
Online marketplaces are websites or networks that allow people to acquire goods and 
services through the internet.  It serves as a great tool for selling products to customers, as 
evidenced by the success of Amazon and Dell.  Most large corporations have created similar 
websites to sell their own products.   
This new trend promotes improving efficiency and morale. These marketplaces 
service: 1) partnership between companies (B2C), and 2) employees within a company 
(B2E).  Coca Cola’s new CEO, E. Neville Isdell, entered the company promoting the 
philosophy that “skilled and motivated employees are the key to realizing strategic goals.” 
Online marketplaces act as a communication tool to spread the goals and mission of the 
company to employees, while simultaneously streamlining internal processes, such as human 
resources. Coca Cola implemented an extensive B2E program, which it employs to 
communicate with and provide services, such as benefits online, to its employees. 
Other companies that have recently built a B2E system include: Delta, Charles Schwab, and 
Cisco.155  
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
 
The FAA was once on the GAO’s high-risk list. The new CFO was challenged to:  
1) Improve financial data 
2) Improve financial controls 
3) Improve cost efficiency 
In order to complete the above, the FAA’s new CFO turned to value management to 
find excellence in financial management. FAA:  
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 1) Built checks and balances into procurement 
2) Set tough performance goals and frequently measured progress 
3) Meticulously accounted for even the smallest expenditures 
4) Cut costs whenever possible (particularly through consolidation practices) 
5) Outsourced flight service station(s) 
6) Standardized IT equipment, servers, and processes 
7) Centralized many web pages under its public affairs organization 
8) Centralized oversight of realty 
9) Forced every department in the agency to come up with creative ways to save  
10) Switched to Delphi’s financial management system 
11) Created a committee of senior executives (Joint Resource Council) to review every 
major project 
What do others think? Remesh Punwani, FAA CFO explained, “Our auditors told us 
that working with the FAA is like a dream compared to some of the other federal agencies: 
‘We think that you guys are more progressive and proactive than any other federal agency 
that we’ve worked with.’”  But the pace of change within the FAA is glacial. Punwani 
suggests, “The challenge is not just to come up with new systems but to demonstrate to 




“The Quality Company”: 
Six Sigma: Although Motorola is the company first credited with employing Six 
Sigma, GE, under the charismatic leadership of Jack Welch, made the management program 
mainstream.  Even in retirement, Welch still touts the merit of Six Sigma, which continues to 
be an essential component of the GE management process.  
Six Sigma is a statistical mean of improving quality, and, “according to General 
Electric (GE)—an early adopter of the program—Six Sigma is a ‘disciplined methodology of 
defining, measuring, analyzing, improving and controlling the quality in every one of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
155 See Hansen & Deimler (2001, Fall); Karamally (2004, July); www.coca-cola.com 
156 See Dickey (2006, July 15); GAO (2004, November 12); www.faa.gov 
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 company's products, processes and transactions—with the ultimate goal of virtually 
eliminating all defects.’” Since implementing the program, leaders in management realized 
that more than process and methodology, change is needed.  GE pushed internal campaigns 
to achieve “buy-in,” and created a very popular leadership training program, which revolves 
around the Six Sigma management philosophy.  
Notable traits of the GE culture include a highly competitive spirit, characterized by a 
stated goal of being first or second in their field, and an open communication network, 
characterized by the open circulation of company information.   However, one of the 
problems with benchmarking GE is that much of the success remains credited to the 
leadership of Jack Welch.  Moreover, critics of Six Sigma argue that the process remains too 
inward looking, internally competitive, and big, all of which contribute to failure.157    
 
In the 1960s, American Machine and Foundry (AMF) acquired Harley-Davidson. 
They sought to reduce costs during a time of economic downturn and competition from 
Japan. Unfortunately, they ignored Harley-Davidson’s commitment to quality and created 
motorcycles rampant with mechanical defects. In 1981, Jeff Bluestein and twelve other 
Harley-Davidson executives bought the company from AMF. Despite struggles throughout 
the 80s and early 90s, Harley-Davidson currently maintains a competitive advantage and 
remains committed to selling quality products while reducing costs. 
Harley-Davidson 
Cost-reducing Methods:  
1) Supplier Network:  Vice President of Materials and Product Cost, Garry Berryman, 
identified problem areas within Harley’s supply base.  He created a purchasing 
engineer position and sought to create a much closer relationship with suppliers.  The 
new Product Development Center brought product development engineers and 
suppliers under one roof.  Maintenance, Repair and Operating (MRO) contracts were 
examined and consolidated.  Not surprisingly, costs plummeted. 
                                                 
157 See Henderson & Evans (2000); Morris (2006, July 11); Ramberg (2000, May) 
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 2) Quality Control:  Berryman also created the Supplier Advisory Council.  The council 
helped create a Master Supplier Agreement focused on reducing costs, improving 
quality, and reducing time spent developing new products.  Harley demanded specific 
quality levels from its suppliers.  In order to facilitate the demands required by the 
master agreement, Harley offered its own engineers and staff for assistance.  Quality 
levels rapidly improved. 
3) The Harley Triangle:  When Garry Berryman arrived in 1995, he knew that product 
quality and supplier relationships were not the only cornerstones that Harley-
Davidson needed to develop.  Developing an efficient means to transport products 
and communicate with suppliers was also critical.  The Harley Triangle, a network of 
factories, outsourced and internal transportation, and Just-in-time techniques, is the 
result. 
4) Core Competencies: Today, Harley prides itself on its quality and supply efficiency.  
Areas that were weaknesses a decade ago are now company strong suits.  
Accordingly, Purchasing Magazine awarded Harley Davidson its Gold Medal of 
Excellence for outstanding performance in 2000. 
5) Competitive Advantage: The improvements Harley Davidson made in supply, 
transportation, and quality allowed it to exploit one of its most significant competitive 
advantages: an almost cult-like following amongst US motorcyclists.  This strong 
brand name differentiates it from its competitors and gives Harley a strong advantage 
in the heavy weight motorcycle market.158  
 
Hewlett-Packard 
“It is necessary that people work together in unison toward common objectives and 
avoid working at cross purposes at all levels if the ultimate in efficiency and 
achievement is to be obtained.”       
  - David Packard 
HP's Corporate Objectives have guided the company in the conduct of its business 
since 1957, when first written by co-founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard. Hewlett and 
Packard successfully promoted a different kind of work environment and became one of the 
first companies to offer its employees stock options. Each corporate objective carries an 
explicitly-stated associated underlying belief. 
                                                 
158 See Baker, Keeler, Shipp, Sinram & Schultz (2005); Beaver & Bronson (2004); Fililczak (1996, February); 
Handfield, Monczka & Robert (2005); Hamel & Prahalad (1990); Hannon (2003, July 17); Milligan (2000, 
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 HP’s Corporate Objectives are as follows: 
1) Customer Loyalty  
2) Profit  
3) Market Leadership  
4) Growth 
5) Employee Commitment 
6) Leadership Capability 
7) Global Citizenship  
When an “outsider” CEO, Carly Fiorina proposed a merger of HP and Compaq, 
significant resistance emerged centered around perceived fears that HP’s corporate culture 
would change. 
Supply-chain Management: 
In 2003, HP introduced its new Supplier Code of Conduct to their top 50 suppliers, 
and now that number has grown to 450. The Supply Chain Social Environmental 
Responsibility program is comprised of five key elements: 
• A clearly defined policy, vision and direction, supported by senior management  
• Ongoing development and distribution of HP policies and standards  
• Conformity assessment and monitoring  
• Corrective action planning based on continuous improvement  
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International Business Machines (IBM) 
“Would you like me to give you a formula for... success? It's quite simple, really. 
Double your rate of failure. You're thinking of failure as the enemy of success. But it 
isn't at all... you can be discouraged by failure, or you can learn from it. So go ahead 
and make mistakes. Make all you can. Because, remember that's where you'll find 
success. On the far side.”           —
Thomas J. Watson 
In 1993, Lou Gerstner was hired to break apart IBM. After a thorough investigation, 
he felt that the company could be profitable once again. The focus at IBM changed to one of 
“knowledge and solution service.” They are now about “e-business on demand.” 
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 To ensure the success of the company, IBM streamlined the company and laid-off 
workers. Lou Gerstner wanted “One IBM.” 
Structural Changes: 
IBM made the following changes to optimize structural efficiency: 
1) Shifted 100 data centers into 3 large centers powered by server farms 
2) Leadership roles changed 
3) Lay-offs 
4) Restructured its 128 CIOs into one position 
5) Created a new division to be the central focus of the company, IBM Global Services 
(IGS)  
6) Outsourced non-value added functions 
On-demand Service: 
The company strives to focus on Customer Service with the aid of six guiding 
principles: 
1. Measuring success in customer satisfaction and creation of shareholder value 
2. Building competitive advantage in productivity, efficiency, cost, quality, 
responsiveness and cash management 
3. Delivering a “superior end-to-end customer experience” 
4. Executing with speed and urgency through simplified processes 
5. Demonstrating IBM’s leadership in “e-business on demand” while being recognized 
as the industry’s supply-chain leader 
6. Developing employee skills under the auspices of an integrated team. 
Cost Management: 
IBM also: 
1) Outsourced functions where it did not have a competitive advantage 
2) Increased reliance on internet (automated procurement) 




                                                 
160 See Applegate (2006, January); Capo, Steele, Thompson & Whiting (2006); Garr (2000); Radjou (2005, 




“Intel. Leap ahead.™ An idea, a mantra, a call to action. Leap ahead declares who we 
are and where we are going. These two words capture what drives us, inspires us, 
galvanizes us into action, and unites us in purpose and practice. It is the simple 
embodiment of what we make possible for people every where.”  In order to “leap 
ahead,” Intel must promote external interdependencies and deal effectively with 
internal tensions.  
External Interdependencies: 
1) Foster external innovation   
2) “Boundary-setting” activities  
3) Coordinate innovation across firms  
Internal Tensions:  
Intel acknowledges these tensions and feels they are a necessary component of 
platform leadership. One employee states, “Intel does not expect these tensions to be ‘solved’ 
as soon as they emerge, however; rather, the firm has management processes that encourage 
formalized internal debate on the issues underlying these tensions, where dissenting views 
can be expressed. This debate takes place under the clear authority of a judging party 
comprising the executive staff of Andy Grove, Gordon Moore, and Craig Barrett.”  
Intel has formal mechanisms in place to deal with problems: 
1) Process of Strategic Long Range Planning (SLRP) meetings twice a year. “It’s a very 
intense, fairly confrontational process” 
2) Product Line Business Plan (PLBP) meetings; more specific then SLRP meetings 
3) Intel Objectives: Put colorful posters on every wall, in every cubicle, in every 
meeting room. 
Andy Groves161 asserts that Intel’s culture permits open confrontation, and that is important 
to allow “strategic dissonance”—defined as the divergence between actions and statements. 
                                                 
161 Groves (1996) 
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 Another critical aspect of Intel is their belief that critical to socialization of new employees is 
a “tolerance for ambiguity.”162
 
K-Mart 
Facing Failure:  
In the 1950s, K-Mart was the company that caught Woolworth, Kresge, and Dayton 
Hudson unprepared for the new discount retail market.  Unfortunately, during the early 
1990s, K-Mart, once the top discount retailer in the industry, fell to third within five years 
(due in large part to disorganization and bad strategy).   
Force to Change:  
Facing eminent extinction, K-Mart reorganized to stay alive.  Drastic changes were 
made.  The company realigned itself to focus more on the customer.  New executives were 
hired and put on a performance-based reward system, specifically performance of their 
customer service program.   
The company also had to scale back. Separate (and recently acquired) businesses in 
books, office supplies, and other industries were sold off, and stores across the country 
closed. K-Mart reorganized those stores still open to carry more products, such as food, to 
meet customer demand. Although in the short term, Kmart cannot reclaim its number-one 
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The Originator and Model Company for Six Sigma:  
Motorola is often credited for creating Six Sigma in the 1980s.  Since winning the 
Malcolm Balbridge Award in 1988, Motorola has led the popularization of Six Sigma into 
the leading management technique today. It is one of two, the other being GE, that are cited 
as the best benchmarks for the program.   
Motorola continually sets goals to reduce the rate of defects to a fraction of a 
percentage point.  These goals are criticized by some as arbitrary and a public relations 
move.  Despite criticism, management at Motorola implemented a karate-influenced, image-
laden leadership training program where managers receive belts of different color and rank 
based on how well they apply the Six Sigma process to their work.  Although it sounds 
superficial, the training program does form rigidity within the system and makes 
communication within the company homogenous.   
Another reason for Six Sigma effectiveness is, like at GE, Six Sigma remains 
embedded in Motorola culture.  The Change Agents, required when implementing Six 
Sigma, are composed of more than just Black Belts managers.  To succeed, there must be 
leadership, champions, and sponsors.  In other words, everyone has to “buy in,” or believe, in 
Six Sigma. At Motorola, not only do they believe in the process, they also market the 
program to other companies and organizations.  Motorola University is a consulting/training 
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The All-encompassing Beverage Company:  
Seagram primarily sold top-shelf liquor to a loyal customer base; but, over the years, 
the company chose to diversify and move beyond its core industry into manufacturing and 
media. In the mid-1990s, Seagram reengineered the company to better manage the transition.   
“The reengineering task involved hundreds of employees throughout Seagram, 
organized into teams to redesign and streamline key business processes,” such as:  
1) Business Planning 
2) Management Information System 
3) Finance, Customer Fulfillment 
4) Marketing, and Manufacturing  
                                                 
165 http://www.qualityamerica.com/knowledgecente/articles/PYZDEKSixSigRev.htm
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 They also seek best practices from other companies to shift operations within 
Seagram from an internal focus to an external customer focus.   
Moreover, culture was the hallmark of Seagram’s change.  CEO Edgar Bronfman, Jr., 
personally drafted nine values and began a nine-month corporate value-building program for 
all employees at Seagram.  He formulated a three-prong plan: 
1) A personalized communication cascade 
2) A 360-degree feedback process for the senior executives 
3) A training program for equipping the top 1,200 managers.   
Seagram’s extensive cultural change program is considered a success by the business 
community.   
Successful Change Does Not Mean Successful Strategy:  
In 2000, Bronfman merged with Vivendi and moved away from beverage to media.  
The estimated loss from the strategic change is around $3 billion.  Recent performance 
improvement has redeemed Bronfman, but has not completely undone the harm of past 
mistakes.  This demonstrates that successful change does not necessarily stem from a well-
perceived strategy. A similar example is the merger between AOL and Time Warner (most 
criticism falling on Time Warner for agreeing to the deal).166
Southwest Airlines (SWA) 
Mission:  
 
Southwest Airlines clearly states its: 
Dedication to the highest quality of Customer Service delivered with a sense of 
warmth, friendliness, individual pride, and Company Spirit. To Our Employees: We 
are committed to provide our Employees a stable work environment with equal 
opportunity for learning and personal growth. Creativity and innovation are 
encouraged for improving the effectiveness of Southwest Airlines. Above all, 
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 Employees will be provided the same concern, respect, and caring attitude within the 
organization that they are expected to share externally with every Southwest 
Customer. 
Southwest Airlines does the following to ensure that the mission infiltrates into the 
entire organization:  
1) Invites family members of employees to all events 
2) Make employees feel like they are part of a cause (helping people fly who normally 
could not afford to do so) 
3) Place Mission within company literature  
4) Instruct employees to take whatever action necessary to help customers and 
employees (tell employees empowering stories of good deeds) 
5) Catalyze humor and heart: employees encouraged to be kooky; company has casual 
dress days; employees can dress up in costumes; CEO plays tricks and sings at 
company functions; and employees produce rap videos and perform songs and dances 
at company celebrations 
6) Instill in employees a strong work ethic (encouraged to be flexible so they can reduce 
staffing requirements below their competitors) 
The selection process at SWA remains rigid regarding values and attitudes. They 
have group interviews with jokes and role-playing to search out employees who work well in 
a team, have a sense of humor, and have a capacity to act spontaneously. When hired, the 
new employee is given a celebration greeting into the company; a senior employee is 
assigned as a mentor, and training includes humorous videos and skits about the company’s 
culture of teamwork and fun. Financial and non-financial rewards are consistent with the 
literature. In 1999, SWA officially adopted a no-layoff policy. They also allow lateral 
transfers and promotions within the organization. 
Southwest Airlines also articulates its mission to its suppliers. On its website, SWA 
tell suppliers, “A key component of providing the highest quality of customer service and a 
stable work environment is low fares. In order to keep our fares low, we must keep our costs 
low. We are, therefore, dedicated to finding ways to lower our costs and increase our 
productivity and quality.”167
                                                 





Lean and Lean Six Sigma:  
In manufacturing, no other company has the reputation of Toyota.  Toyota is known 
as the top of the class in implementing Lean and Lean Six Sigma. Other car manufacturers 
have adopted Lean, but none with the same success rate as Toyota.    
Toyota freely allows visits to the factory floor, but unfortunately, Toyota is one of the 
most difficult companies to emulate.  Workers have not been able to articulate how they are 
able to manufacture their products so efficiency and attribute their success to the company 
culture of efficiency. The company invented Lean manufacturing and implemented the 
program successfully in the early 1980s.  Lean manufacturing calls for the elimination of 
waste at every stage of production.168  
United States Postal Service (USPS) 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC):  
The BSC, invented by Robert Kaplan and David Norton, is a means to measure a 
company’s performance. Unlike other measures, BSC approaches measurement from four 
perspectives: customer, financial, internal, and innovation and learning. “The balanced 
scorecard lets executives see whether they have improved in one area at the expense of 
another.”   
Postal Service Implementation of the BSC:  
Before the 1990s, the USPS relied on economic growth to drive mail volume up and 
increase business.  That assumption led to inefficiency and a lower quality of service.  This 
inefficiency led to reform in the mid 1990s, specifically the implementation of the BSC.  
USPS created the Establishing Committee to tailor the program to the organization.   
                                                 
168 See Glauser (2005, April 1); Spear & Bowen (1998, September/October); http://www.toyota.com/ 
67 
 Three different perspectives were created: 
1) Productivity measurement 
2) Revenue generation measurement 
3) Customer perspective 
From the data collected, they created five key goals (aka, the five-point star):  
1) Developing people 
2) Pursuing reform 
3) Managing costs 
4) Growing revenue 
4) Improving service 
In 2004, the American Society for Quality described the USPS as “the most improved 




“Every Home . . . Everywhere. With Pride, Passion, and Performance. These words 
represent the vision that will guide Whirlpool into the future.” 
Challenges:  
Major appliance manufacturing is very price competitive. The home appliance 
industry must market high-value products at an affordable price while simultaneously 
maintaining profitability.  The problems Whirlpool experienced was due in large part to its 
phenomenal growth.  Whirlpool grew mainly through acquisition and geographic expansion 
and became too complex for outdated spreadsheets and manual procedures.  Whirlpool CIO, 
Esat Sezer, commented that, “Our supply chain was becoming a competitive disadvantage for 
us.”  
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 Four Identified Strategy Goals:  
1) Understand the Customer Needs  
2) Identify Trade Partner Priorities  
3) Benchmark the Competition  
4) Build for the Future 
Reforms: 
IT: Whirlpool developed web-based supply-chain management operations to 
communicate with trading partners.  To alleviate pressure on Whirlpool’s IT staff, they also 
entered into a five year, $39 million contract with Keane Inc. to provide application support.  
Keane development and management consultants also provided repair and help desk support 
for Whirlpool’s SAP R/3 ERP system, electronic data interchange, and existing call center 
applications. Customer satisfaction was the impetus behind hiring Keane.  In 2002, 
Whirlpool also installed the i2 TradeMatrix Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and 
Replenishment (CPFR) system, a web-based collaboration tool for sharing and combining 
sales forecasts of Whirlpool and its major customers: Sears, Lowe’s, and Best Buy.  
Additionally, Whirlpool turned to IBM for assistance in developing web portals for smaller 
customers who did not have dedicated system-to-system connectivity with Whirlpool and 
had to submit orders via telephone or fax.   
Customer Focused: Whirlpool directly communicated with customers, seeking out 
their thoughts and concerns.   
Selectivity: Whirlpool became selective when choosing which suppliers to partner 
with, and recognized the vital role suppliers played in maintaining Whirlpool’s status as the 
world’s leading home appliance manufacturer.  By utilizing the best possible suppliers 
globally, Whirlpool endeavored to meet its customers’ desires with the most competitive 
costs, best quality, and on-time deliveries.  Whirlpool engages certain key suppliers in their 
customized Six Sigma methodology, known as Operational Excellence (OPEX), which 
strives to have participants consistently improving quality levels, lowering costs, and 
shortening cycle times.  
Flexibility: Flexibility in its supply-chain management systems is critical for 
Whirlpool’s survival into the future.  With changing global environments and shifting 
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 business practices, flexible and innovative software, as well as dedicated support to affect 
those changes, should ensure Whirlpool success.170  
World Bank  
   
Knowledge Management: 
Knowledge management, a relatively new concept, is a management technique for 
building processes and structure to facilitate information sharing within a community or 
organization.  Well-managed knowledge systems can help companies innovate, prepare for 
changing environments, and grow.   
The World Bank is an organization known for its knowledge management system.  It 
touts the knowledge program, reminding its clients that to succeed in the future one must 
have a sound understanding of the knowledge economy, which feeds on information. The 
Word Bank Institute is a think tank established by the bank to prepare for exactly this type of 
future. Additionally, World Bank created the KD4 program, which helps gather, filter, and 
disseminate information to various clienteles.  
World Bank made sure their structure allowed for information sharing. For instance, 
World Bank’s communities of practice, communities customized for different regions and 
countries, facilitate the creation, sharing, and dissemination of information. Moreover, World 
Bank sought to address the importance of face-to-face time. They structured their facilities to 
bring people together to share and generate knowledge—meaning the bank constructed 
mechanisms to train and advise countries on how to create knowledge and circulate that 
knowledge back to the bank.   
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 Finally, communication of these knowledge goals to employees and clients is a top 
priority at World Bank.171
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 VII. Conclusion—Implications for Modeling 
Transformation in Sea Enterprise 
This study has reviewed the recent history of business management reform in the 
Department of Defense and in the Department of the Navy, and we have examined the 
scholarly and practitioner literature on organizational change.  These early chapters set the 
context in which to consider benchmarking for Sea Enterprise.  Two observations can be 
drawn from these chapters.  First, Sea Enterprise has embarked upon a change agenda that 
has antecedents in previous change initiatives.  Second, it is possible to model Sea Enterprise 
against the main themes of change literature to observe where Sea Enterprise is conforming 
or not conforming to models of successful organizational change. 
Subsequent chapters then examine the definitions, concepts and techniques of 
benchmarking.  A typology of benchmarking is developed that helps to inform the ultimate 
question of this report—the identification of benchmarking candidates for Sea Enterprise.  
The final chapter identifies benchmarking candidates in the commercial sector and in 
government, and suggests the type of benchmarking and outstanding characteristics of each 
candidate. 
Our conclusion is that modeling and benchmarking can help the leaders and managers 
of Sea Enterprise understand, promote, and advance the success of this important change 
initiative. Based on this work, it is possible to: (1) develop a model of successful 
transformation, (2) employ that model to evaluate Sea Enterprise and make recommendations 
in specific areas (such as in communications where N4 has recently initiated a research 
engagement), and (3) more closely identify benchmarking partners and determine the 
potential for applying their "best practices" to Sea Enterprise. 
It should be possible to choose private- and public-sector organizations as potential 
partners, gain access and gather information to identify critical elements common to 
successful transformation to determine if and how these practices can be implemented in the 
Navy.  Studying organizations that have an ongoing program of innovation may reveal 
models for transformation and/or best practices that lead to ongoing innovation. Ultimately, 
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 pilot tests could be performed in some selected specific areas of transformation using an 
appropriately similar benchmarking partner. 
Finally, we recommend that Sea Enterprise consider supporting a research program 
about sustaining transformation under two near-term conditions:   
• First, to address the question of sustaining its change initiative through 
leadership transitions.  Leadership change is a key facet of sustained change.  
Leadership change happens frequently in the DoD and in the Navy. It often appears 
that management reform initiatives do not survive leadership transitions, 
notwithstanding the success or failure of any particular reform initiative.  Fortunately, 
the recent CNO transition has been accomplished without a redirection of 
management reform.  Nevertheless, with national elections only two years away, a 
new management agenda, replacing the current “transformation” agenda will 
eventually emerge.  Institutionalizing the principles of Sea Enterprise will be 
important to future leadership transitions.  
• Second, to address the question of sustaining transformation in a period of 
reduced base budgets.  If the budget top-line of DoD and the Navy is destined to 
decline in the near future, there will be pressure both to accelerate transformation and 
to abandon it to avoid costs.  An understanding of this challenge and a strategy for 
sustainment will be needed. 
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 Appendix A. Summary of Benchmarking Subjects, 
Typology and Literature 































Collins, C., & Porras, J. (1994). Built to last: Successful 
habits of visionary companies. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers.  
 
Collins, C., & Porras, J.  (1998). Building your company’s 
vision. Harvard Business Review on Change, Harvard 
Business School Press.  
 
Lencioni, P. (2002, July). Make your values mean 




Jick, T., & Peiperl, M. (2003). Managing change: Case 
and concepts. (2nd ed.).  New 




Baker, C., Keeler, D., Shipp, W., Sinram, M., & Schultz, 
B. (2005, September 23). A turnaround story: 
From the brink of bankruptcy to world class management. 
(Final Paper GE 3306, 
Naval Postgraduate School). Unpublished. 
 
Beaver, G. & Bronson, J. (2004). Strategic change in the 
face of success? Harley 
Davidson, Inc. Strategic Change, 13(4), 205-218.  
 
Fililczak, B. (1996, February). The soul of the Hog.  
Training, 33(2), 38. 
 
Handfield, R., Monczka, R., & Robert, T. (2005). 
Purchasing and supply chain management. (3rd ed.).  
Mason, OH: Thomson Southwestern.   
 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C.K. (1990).  The core competence 
of the corporation.  The 
Harvard Business Review, 68, 79-91.  
75 
  
Hannon, D.  (2003, July 17). The Harley triangle: Where 
freight inefficiency disappears.  Purchasing.   
 
Milligan, B. (2000, September 21). Harley-Davidson wins 
by getting suppliers on board.  Purchasing, 52-65. 
 
Porter, M. (1985). Competitive advantage. New York: The 
Free Press. 
 
Sullivan, L.  (2004). Ready to roll: Harley-Davidson’s 
three-year effort to build closer ties to suppliers is paying 
off.  Information Week, 979, 45-46. 
 
Will, G.  (2002, July 22). Hog heaven: Harley at 100.  




Prior-Smith, K., & Perrin, M. (2006). Ideas on motivating 
people, addressing complaints and training (IMPACT): An 
application of benchmarking. Learning best practice from 
Hewlett-Packard. Business Process Re-engineering &   




Gittell, J., Cameron, K., & Lim, S. (2005). Relationships, 
layoffs, and organizational resilience: Airline industry 
responses to September 11th. Center for Positive 
Organizational Scholarship, Ross School of Business, 
Working Paper Series. 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.  
 
Milliman, J., Ferguson, J., Trickett, D., & Condemi, B. 
(1999). Spirit and community at Southwest Airlines: An 
investigation of a spiritual values-based 
model. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 




Anthes, G. (2005, June 6). Supply chain whirl. 
Computerworld. Retrieved July 25, 2006, from 
http://www.itbusinessedge.com/item/?ci=1166.  
 
Gibson, B., Rutner, S., & Manrodt, K.  (2005, November 
1). How trigger events can get the CEO’s attention. Supply 
Chain Management Review, 40-45. 
 
Greenemeier, L.  (2001, November 19). Whirlpool’s web 




Ireton, J., Radak, R., Strassberger, J., Brophy, M., & 
76 
 Schultz, B. (2006, Spring). Whirlpool 
Corporation. (Final Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate 
School). Unpublished.  
 
Porter, M. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. 
Harvard Business Review, 57(2), 137-145. 
 
Slone, R.  (2004, October). Leading a supply chain 


























Government Accountability Office. (2004, January 30). 
Human capital: Selected agencies’ experiences and lessons 
learned in designing training and development programs. 
GAO-04-291. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from  
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.     
 
Government Accountability Office. (2003, March 13). 
Results-oriented cultures: Creating a clear linkage between 
individual performance and organizational success. GAO-
03-488. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from  
ttp://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html. h 
Government Accountability Office. (2003, April 11). 
Human capital: Selected agency actions to integrate human 
capital approaches to attain mission results. GAO-03-446. 
Retrieved July 19, 2006, from  
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
 
Government Accountability Office. (2003, July 2). Results-
oriented cultures: Implementation steps to assist mergers 
and organizational transformations. GAO 03-669. 





Hansen, M., & Deimler, M. (2001, Fall). Cutting cost while 
improving morale using B2E.  Sloan Management Review, 
96-100.   
 
Karamally, L. (2004, July).  Coke’s new CEO focuses on 




Prior-Smith, K., & Perrin, M. (2006). Ideas on motivating 
people, addressing complaints and training (IMPACT): An 
application of benchmarking. Learning best practice from 
Hewlett-Packard. Business Process Re-engineering & 




Gawer, A. (2000, February). The organization of platform 
leadership: An empirical investigation of Intel’s 
77 
 management processes aimed at fostering complementary 
innovation by third parties. (Doctoral Dissertation, MIT).  




Gittell, J., Cameron, K., & Lim, S. (2005). Relationships, 
layoffs, and organizational resilience: Airline industry 
responses to September 11th. Center for Positive 
Organizational Scholarship, Ross School of Business, 
Working Paper Series. Forthcoming in the Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science.  
 
Milliman, J., Ferguson, J., Trickett, D., & Condemi, B. 
(1999). Spirit and community at Southwest Airlines: An 
investigation of a spiritual values-based model. Journal of 


















Sirkin, H., Keenan, P., & Jackson, A. (2005, October). The 
hard side of change management. Harvard Business 
Review, 108-118. 
 
Wahid, H., Jackson, A., & Sirkin, H. (2004, September 
15). Transformation: How consumer companies can load 
the DICE in their favor. A Boston Consulting 






Kaplan, R., & Norton, D. (2005, July/August).  The 
balanced scorecard: measures that drive performance. 
Harvard Business Review, 172-180. 
 
Mathys, N., & Thompson, K. (2006). Using the business 
scorecard: Lessons learned from the US Postal Service and 
the Defense Finance Service.  Managing for 
Performance and Results Series, IBM Center for the 





















Dickey, B. (2006, July 15). Coming clean: The FAA goes 
from high risk to high profile with its financial makeover. 
Government Executive, 39-46. 
 
GAO. (2004, November 12). Air traffic control: FAA’s 
acquisition management has improved, but policies and 
oversight need strengthening to help ensure result.  






Applegate, L. (2006, January). IBM’s decade of 
transformation: The turnaround. Harvard Business School 
Case Study #9-805-130, 23, 5.  
 
Capo, D., Steele, L., Thompson, S., & Whiting, NAS. 
(2006, Spring). IBM: Supply chain masters. (Final Paper 
GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). 
Unpublished. 
 
Garr, D. (2000). IBM redux: Lou Gerstner and the business 
turnaround of thedecade. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers.  
 
Radjou, N. (2005, March 24).  IBM transforms its supply 
chain to drive growth. Forrester Research, Inc., Best 




Christensen, C. (2003). The innovator’s dilemma. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 128-132.   
 
Labovitz, G., & Rosansky, V. (1997).  The power of 
alignment: How great companies stay centered and 
accomplish extraordinary things. Canada, New Jersey: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.   
 
Lilo, A. (2000, July 7). “Kmart rocks on.” Home Textiles 




Jick, T., & Peiperl, M. (2003). Managing change: Case 
and concepts. (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education.   
 
The Observer Business & Media. (2006, July 2). Bronfman 
does it his way. TheObserver. Retrieved July 25, 2006, 
from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,1810 
















Hammer, M. (2002, Winter). The future of Six Sigma. 
Sloan Management Review, 26-32. 
 
Nave, D. (2002, March). How to compare Six Sigma, 
Lean, and the Theory of Constraints. Quality Progress, 73-
78. 
 
Womack, J., & Jones, D. (1994, March/April). From Lean 
Production to the Lean Enterprise. Harvard Business 
Review, 93-103. 
 
GE: Six Sigma 
79 
  
Henderson, K., & Evans, J. (2000). Successful 
implementation of Six Sigma: Benchmarking General 
Electric Company. Benchmarking: An International 
Journal, 7(4), 260-280.  
 
Morris, B. (2006, July 11). Tearing up the Jack Welch 




Ramberg, J. (2000, May). Six Sigma: Fad or 





MOTOROLA: Six Sigma 
 
Barney, M. (2002, May). Motorola’s second generation. 
Six Sigma Forum Magazine, 13-16.   
 
Caulcutt, R. (2001). Why is Six Sigma so successful? 
Journal of Applied Statistics, 28(3/4), 301-306.   
 
Pyzdek, Thomas. (1994-2004). The Six Sigma revolution. 






Jick, T., & Peiperl, M. (2003). Managing change: Case 
and concepts. (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education.   
 
The Observer Business & Media. (2006, July 2). Bronfman 
does it his way. TheObserver. Retrieved July 25, 2006, 
from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,181 





TOYOTA: Lean Manufacturing & Lean Six Sigma 
 
Glauser, E. (2005, April 1). The Toyota phenomenon. The 
Swiss Deming Institute, 12-15.   
 
Spear, S., & Bowen, K. (1998, September/October). 
Decoding the DNA of the Toyota production system. 
Harvard Business Review, 96-106.    
 
WORLD BANK: Knowledge Management 
 
Egan, M. (2003). Creating a knowledge bank. Strategic HR 
80 
 Review, 2(2), 30-35. 
 
Laporte, B. (2002). Knowledge is a currency at the World 



















Dickey, B. (2006, July 15). Coming clean: The FAA goes 
from high risk to high profile with its financial makeover. 
Government Executive, 39-46. 
 
GAO. (2004, November 12). Air traffic control: FAA’s 
acquisition management has improved, but policies and 
oversight need strengthening to help ensure result. 





Baker, C., Keeler, D., Shipp, W., Sinram, M., & Schultz, 
B. (2005, September 23). A turnaround story: From the 
brink of bankruptcy to world class management. (Final 
Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). Unpublished. 
 
Beaver, G., & Bronson, J. (2004). Strategic change in the 
face of success? Harley Davidson, Inc. Strategic Change, 
13(4), 205-218.  
 
Fililczak, B. (1996, February). The soul of the Hog.  
Training, 33(2), 38. 
 
Handfield, R., Monczka, R., & Robert, T. (2005). 
Purchasing and supply chain Management. (3rd ed.).  
Mason, OH: Thomson Southwestern.   
 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C.K. (1990).  The core competence 
of the corporation.  The Harvard Business Review, 68, 79-
91.  
 
Hannon, D.  (2003, July 17). The Harley triangle: Where 
freight inefficiency disappears.  Purchasing.   
 
Milligan, B. (2000, September 21). Harley-Davidson wins 
by getting suppliers on board.  Purchasing, 52-65. 
 
Porter, M. (1985). Competitive advantage. New York: The 
Free Press. 
 
Sullivan, L.  (2004). Ready to roll: Harley-Davidson’s 
three-year effort to build closer ties to suppliers is paying 
off.  Information Week, 979, 45-46. 
 
Will, G.  (2002, July 22). Hog heaven: Harley at 100.  





Gittell, J., Cameron, K., & Lim, S. (2005). Relationships, 
layoffs, and organizational resilience: Airline industry 
responses to September 11th. Center for Positive 
Organizational Scholarship, Ross School of Business, 
Working Paper Series. Forthcoming in the Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science.  
 
Milliman, J., Ferguson, J., Trickett, D., & Condemi, B. 
(1999). Spirit and community at Southwest Airlines: An 
investigation of a spiritual values-based model. Journal of 




Anthes, G. (2005, June 6).  Supply chain whirl. 
Computerworld. Retrieved July 25, 2006, from    
 http://www.itbusinessedge.com/item/?ci=1166.  
 
Gibson, B., Rutner, S., & Manrodt, K.  (2005, November 
1). How trigger events can get the CEO’s attention. Supply 
Chain Management Review, 40-45. 
 
Greenemeier, L.  (2001, November 19) Whirlpool’s Web 




Ireton, J., Radak, R., Strassberger, J., Brophy, M., & 
Schultz, B. (2006, Spring). Whirlpool Corporation. (Final 
Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). 
Unpublished.  
 
Porter, M. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. 
Harvard Business Review, 57(2), 137-145. 
 
Slone, R.  (2004, October). Leading a supply chain 
turnaround.  Harvard Business Review, 82(10), 114-121. 
82 
 VIII. References and Bibliography 
Abrahamson, E. (2004, Winter). Avoiding repetitive change syndrome. Sloan Management 
Review, 93-95. 
Abrahamson, E., & Fairchild, G. (1999, December). Management fashion: Lifecycles, 
triggers, and collective learning processes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), 
708-740.   
Air Force transformation depends on base closing round, Jumper says. (2004, June 28). 
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report.  
American Productivity & Quality Center. (2001). A new approach to assessing 
benchmarking progress. Retrieved June 22, 2006, from http://www.apqc.org.  
American Productivity & Quality Center. The benchmarking code of conduct. January 9, 
2005. Retrieved June 22, 2006, from http://www.apqc.org.  
Anderson, K., & McAdam R. (2004). A critique of benchmarking and performance 
measurement: Lead or lag? Benchmarking. Bradford, 11(5), 465.  
Anthes, G. (2005, June 6). Supply chain whirl. Computerworld. Retrieved July 25, 2006, 
from http://www.itbusinessedge.com/item/?ci=1166.  
Applegate, L. (2006, January). IBM’s decade of transformation: The turnaround. Harvard 
Business School Case Study #9-805-130, 23, 5.  
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. 
Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. 
Aspin, L. (1994). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Baker, C., Keeler, D., Shipp, W., Sinram, M., & Schultz, B. (2005, September 23). A 
turnaround story: From the brink of bankruptcy to world class management. (Final 
Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). Unpublished. 
Barney, M. (2002, May). Motorola’s second generation. Six Sigma Forum Magazine, 13-16.   
Bartunek, J. (1984). Changing interpretive schemes and organization restructuring: The 
example of a religious order. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 355-372. 
Bass, B., & Riggio, R. (2006). Transformational leadership. (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, Inc. 
Bate, P., Khan, R., & Pye, A. (2000, March/April). Towards a culturally sensitive approach 
to organization structuring: Where organization design meets organizational 
development. Organizational Science, 11(2), 197-211. 
83 
 Bateson, Gregory. (1979). Mind and nature: A necessary unity. New York: Dutton.   
Beaver, G., & Bronson, J. (2004). Strategic change in the face of success? Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. Strategic  Change, 13(4), 205-218.  
Beer, M., & Nohria, N. (2000, May/June). Cracking the code of change. Harvard Business 
Review, 78(3), 133-141. 
Beer, M., Eisenstat, R., & Spector, B. (1990, November/December). Why change programs 
don’t produce change. Harvard Business Review, 68(6), 158-166.   
Bemowski, K. (1992). The benchmarking bandwagon. Standards Engineering, 44(4), 86-88. 
Benner, M., & Tushman, M. (2003). Exploitation, exploring, and process management: The 
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review, 28(2), 238-256.   
Bergquist, William. (1993). The modern organization: Mastering the art of organizational 
change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Binnendijk, H., & Kugler, R.L. (2001, November).  Adapting forces to a new era: Ten 
transforming concepts. Defense Horizons. Chapter 3. 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. (1986, February 28). An interim report 
to the President. Retrieved August 3, 2006, from http://www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc 
/pbrc.html.  
Bossidy, L. (2004). Confronting reality: Doing what matters to get things right. New York: 
Crown Business, 46-48. 
Brown, S., & Eisenhardt, K. (1997, March). The art of continuous change: Linking 
complexity theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 1-34. 
Burns, J., & Nielsen, K. (2006, June). How embedded agents engage in institutional change. 
Journal of Economic Issues, 40XL(2), 449-456. 
Cameron, K., & Whetten, D. (2006). Developing management skills. (6th ed.). Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Camp, R.C. (1993). A bible for benchmarking, by Xerox. Financial Executive, 9(4), 23-27. 
Camp, R.C. (1989). Benchmarking: The search for industry best practices that lead to 
superior performance. Milwaukee: ASQC Quality Press. 
Capo, D., Steele, L., Thompson, S., & Whiting, NAS. (2006, Spring). IBM: Supply chain 
masters. (Final Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). Unpublished. 
Carpinetti, L.C.R., & De Melo, A.M. (2002). What to benchmark? A systematic approach 
and cases. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 9(3), 244-255. 
84 
 Caulcutt, R. (2001). Why is Six Sigma so successful? Journal of Applied Statistics, 28(3/4), 
301-306.   
Cebrowski, A.K. A Department of Defense overview of force transformation. Training 
Lesson Overview. 
Cheney, D. (1990, January). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense.  
Christensen, C. (2003). The innovator’s dilemma. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 128-
132.   
Clinton, B. (1993, September 11). Executive Order 12862.  Washington, DC: Office of the 
President. 
Clinton, B. (1993, January 3). Remarks by President Clinton announcing initiative to 
streamline government. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/ speeches/030393.html.   
Cohen, W. (1998). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Cohen, W. (2001). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Collins, C. (2005). Good to great and the social sectors: Why business thinking is not the 
answer. Colorado. Monograph of Collins, J. (2001). Good to great: Why some 
companies make the leap . . . and other’s don’t. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Collins, J. (2001). Good to great: Why some companies make the leap . . . and others don’t. 
New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Collins, J., & Porras, J. (1998). Building your company’s vision. In Harvard Business Review 
on Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 21-54.   
Collins, C., & Porras, J. (1994). Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers.  
Conger, J. (1991). Inspiring others: The language of leadership. Academy of Management 
Executive, 5(1), 170-183, 
Cox, J. R., Mann, L., & Samson, D. (1997). Benchmarking as a mixed metaphor: 
Disentangling assumptions of competition and collaboration. Journal of Management 
Studies, 34(2), 285-314. 
Dattakumar, R., & Jagadeesh, R. (2003). A review of literature on benchmarking. 
Benchmarking: An International Journal, 10(3), 176-209. 
Defense Business Transformation. (2006). FAQ: BEA. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from  
http://www.DoD.gov/dbt/faq_bea.html. 
85 
 Department of Defense. (2006, June 21). Business transformation guidance. Version 1. 
Washington, DC: author.  
Department of Defense. (2003, April). Transformation planning guidance. Washington, DC: 
author.  
Department of the Army. (2005a, July 11). Director of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum: 
Transforming the way we do business executive guidance. Retrieved July 31, 2006, 
from https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32338.   
Department of the Army. (2005b, July 11). Memorandum for MACOM commanders, 
subject: Transforming the way we do business. Retrieved July 31, 2006, from  
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32338. 
Dickey, B. (2006, July 15). Coming clean: The FAA goes from high risk to high profile with 
its financial makeover” Government Executive.  Washington, DC: 39-46. 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2003, Fall). Military 
transformation: a strategic approach.. Washington, DC: author. Retrieved from, 
www.oft.osd.mil Fall, 2003, 8.  Accessed July 31, 2006. 
Drucker, P. (1988, January/February). The coming of the new organization. Harvard 
Business Review, 66(1), 45-53. 
Duck, J. (1998). Managing change: The art of balancing. Harvard Business Review on 
Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 55-81. 
Eesley, D., & Longenecker, C. (2006, January/February). Gateways to intrapreneurship.  
Industrial Management, 48(1), 18-23. 
Egan, M. (2003). Creating a knowledge bank. Strategic HR Review, 2(2), 30-35. 
Elmuti, D., & Kathawala, Y. (1997). An overview of the benchmarking process: A tool for 
continuous improvement and competitive advantage. Benchmarking for Quality 
Management & Technology, 4(4), 229-243.   
Fililczak, B. (1996, February). The soul of the Hog. Training, 33(2), 38. 
Fong, S.W., Cheng, E., & Ho, D. (1998). Benchmarking: A general reading for management 
practitioners. Management Decision, 36(6), 407-418. 
Gansler, J., & Lucyshyn, W. (2005, Winter). Defense business transformation: The way 
forward. The Business of Government, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 
54-63.   
Garamone, J. (2005, March 21). Facing the future: preparing today's military for its next 
challenges.  
Garnett, J. L. (1992). Applying a strategic model to government communication. 
Communicating for Results in Government. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 67-94. 
86 
 Garr, D. (2000). IBM redux: Lou Gerstner and the business turnaround of the decade. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.  
Gawer, A. (2000, February). The organization of platform leadership: An empirical 
investigation of Intel’s management processes aimed at fostering complementary 
innovation by third parties. (Doctoral Dissertation, MIT).  Submitted to the Sloan 
School of Management for review.  
General Motors. (2006). Management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and 




Gibson, B., Rutner, S., & Manrodt, K.  (2005, November 1). How trigger events can get the 
CEO’s attention. Supply Chain Management Review, 40-45. 
Gittell, J., Cameron, K., & Lim, S. (2005). Relationships, layoffs, and organizational 
resilience: Airline industry responses to September 11th. Center for Positive 
Organizational Scholarship, Ross School of Business, Working Paper Series. 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.  
Glauser, E. (2005, April 1). The Toyota phenomenon. The Swiss Deming Institute, 12-15.   
Golumbiewski, R.T., Billingsley, K., & Yeager, S. (1979). Measuring change and persistence 
in human affairs: Types of change generated by OD designs. Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science, (1), 143-155.  
Goss, T., Pascale, R., & Athos, A. (1998). The reinvention roller coaster: Risking the present 
for a powerful future. In Harvard Business Review on Change, Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 83-112. 
Government Accountability Office. (2006, March 31). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected major weapon programs. GAO-06-391. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html. 
Government Accountability Office. (2005, December 5). DoD systems modernization: 
Planned investment in the naval tactical command support system needs to be 
reassessed. GAO-06-215. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html. 
Government Accountability Office. (2005, November 30). Best practices: Better support of 
weapon system program managers needed to improve outcomes. GAO-06-110. 
Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2005, September 29). DoD business systems 
modernization: Navy ERP adherence to best business practices critical to avoid past 
87 
 failures. GAO-05-858.  Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2005, March 31). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected major weapon programs. GAO-05-301. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, November 12). Air traffic control: FAA’s 
acquisition management has improved, but policies and oversight need strengthening 
to help ensure results. GAO-05-23. Retrieved July 21, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0523.pdf.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, November 9). Foreign military sales: DoD needs 
to take additional actions to prevent unauthorized shipments of spare parts. GAO-05-
17. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, September 16). Best practices: Using spend 
analysis to help agencies take a more strategic approach to procurement. GAO-04-
870. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, May 17). DoD business systems modernization: 
Limited progress in development of business enterprise architecture and oversight of 
information technology investments. GAO-04-731R.  Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, March 31). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
major weapon programs. GAO-04-248. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, January 30). Human capital: Selected agencies’ 
experiences and lessons learned in designing training and development programs. 
GAO-04-291. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/ 
featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, January 1). Best practices: Highlights of the 
knowledge-based approach used to improve weapon acquisition. GAO-04-392SP. 
Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/ 
bp_methodology.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2004, January 1). Best practices: Using a knowledge-
based approach to improve weapon acquisition. GAO-04-386SP. Retrieved July 19, 
2006, from http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2003, July 2). Results-oriented cultures: Implementation 
steps to assist mergers and organizational transformations. GAO-03-669. Retrieved 
July 19, 2006, from http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
88 
 Government Accountability Office. (2003, April 11). Human capital: Selected agency actions 
to integrate human capital approaches to attain mission results. GAO-03-446. 
Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2003, March 13). Results-oriented cultures: Creating a 
clear linkage between individual performance and organizational success. GAO-03-
488. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_reviews.html.  
Government Accountability Office. (2003, February 11). Best practices: Setting requirements 
differently could reduce weapon systems’ total ownership costs. GAO-03-57. 
Retrieved July 19, 2006, from 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/bp_benchmark.html.  
Greenemeier, L.  (2001, November 19). Whirlpool’s web chain.  InformationWeek. Retrieved 
July 25, 2006, from 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6507890.   
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C.K. (1990).  The core competence of the corporation.  The Harvard 
Business Review, 68, 79-91.  
Hammer, M. (2004, April). Deep change. Harvard Business Review, 82(4), 84-93. 
Handfield, R., Monczka, R., & Robert, T. (2005). Purchasing and supply chain management. 
(3rd ed.). Mason, OH: Thomson Southwestern.  
Hannon, D.  (2003, July 17). The Harley triangle: Where freight inefficiency disappears.  
Purchasing. 
Henderson, K., & Evans, J. (2000). Successful implementation of Six Sigma: Benchmarking 
General Electric Company. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 7(4), 260-280.  
Hansen, M., & Deimler, M. (2001, Fall). Cutting cost while improving morale using B2E.  
Sloan Management Review, 96-100.   
Huseman, R., & Bilbrey, P. (2005). Break out. Leadership Excellence, 22(9), 2-12.  
Huy, Q. (2001, September). In praise of middle managers. Harvard Business Review, 79(8), 
72-79.   
Huy, Q. (2001, October). Time, temporal capability, and planned change. Academy of 
Management Review, 26(4), 601-623. 
Ingraham, P., Thompson, J., & Sanders, R., Ed. (1998). Transforming government: Lessons 
from the reinvention laboratories. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.   
Ireton, J., Radak, R., Strassberger, J., Brophy, M., & Schultz, B. (2006, Spring). Whirlpool 
Corporation. (Final Paper GE 3306, Naval Postgraduate School). Unpublished.  
89 
 Jick, T., & Peiperl, M. (2003). Managing change: Case and concepts. (2nd ed.).  New York: 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education.   
Kaplan, R., & Norton, D. (2005, July/August).  The balanced scorecard: Measures that drive 
performance. Harvard Business Review, 172-180. 
Karamally, L. (2004, July). Coke’s new CEO focuses on workers. Workforce Management, 
22-23.  
Ketl, D. (2005, December). The next government of the United States: Challenges for 
performance in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of 
Government. 
Kinni, T. (2003, August). Exploit what you do best. Harvard Management Update, 8(8), 3. 
Kotter, J. (1996). Leading change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Kouzmin, A., Loffler, E., Klages, H., & Korac-Kakabadse, N. (1999). Benchmarking and 
performance measurement in public sectors: Towards learning for agency 
effectiveness. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 12(2), 121-144.  
Kraft, J. The Department of the Navy benchmarking handbook: A systems view. 
Washington, DC: Total Quality Leadership Office. 
Labovitz, G., & Rosansky, V. (1997). The power of alignment: How great companies stay 
centered and accomplish extraordinary things. Canada, New Jersey: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Laporte, B. (2002). Knowledge is a currency at the World Bank. KM Review, 5(5), 10-14.   
Lema, N.M., & Price, A.D.F. (1995). Benchmarking: Performance improvement toward 
competitive advantage. Journal of Management in Engineering, 11(1), 28-37.   
Lilo, A. (2000, July 7). Kmart rocks on. Home Textiles Today, 21(46), 21-22. 
Longbottom, D. (2000). Benchmarking in the UK: On empirical study of practitioners and 
academics. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 7(2), 98-117.  
Lopez, C.T. (2005, May 11). Smart Operations 21 office formed at Pentagon, May 11, 2005. 
Martin, R. (1998). Changing the mind of the corporation. In Harvard Business Review on 
Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 113-138. 
Mathys, N., & Thompson, K. (2006). Using the balanced scorecard: Lessons learned from 
the US Postal Service and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Managing 
for Performance and Results Series, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 29-
39. 
Matson, E., & Prusak, L. (2003, Fall). The performance variability dilemma. Sloan 
Management Review, 45(1), 39-44. 
90 
 McCarthy, VADM J.D. (2006, August 8).Operationalizing Sea Enterprise. Briefing to 
Executive Business course.  
Milliman, J., Ferguson, J., Trickett, D., & Condemi, B. (1999). Spirit and community at 
Southwest Airlines: An investigation of a spiritual values-based model. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 12(3), 221-233.  
Milligan, B. (2000, September 21). Harley-Davidson wins by getting suppliers on board.  
Purchasing, 52-65. 
Morris, B. (2006, July 11). Tearing up the Jack Welch Playbook. CNNMoney. Retrieved July 
31, 2006, from http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/10/magazines/fortune/rules.fortune/.  
Morris, Jefferson. (2004, August 4). Iraq operations accelerating transformation, Cebrowski 
says. AerospaceDaily & Defense Report. 
Mullen, Admiral M.G. (2004, January). Sea Enterprise: Resourcing tomorrow’s fleet. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. 
Naval Transformation Roadmap. Retrieved July 6, 2006, from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/ 
navpalib/transformation/trans-pg93.html.  
Oxman, J., & Smith, B. (2003, Fall). The limits of structural change.  Sloan Management 
Review, 45(1), 77-82. 
Perry, W. (1995). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Peters, K.M. (2005, September 1). Under the gun. Government Executive.  September 1, 
2005. Washington, DC. 
Plotkin, H. (1999, June). Six Sigma: What it is and how to use it. Harvard Business Review, 
4(6), 6. 
Porter, M. (1985). Competitive advantage. New York: The Free Press.  
Porter, M. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Business Review, 57(2), 
137-145. 
Powley, E., Fry, R., Barrett, F., & Bright, D. (2004). Dialogic democracy meets command 
and control: Transformation and the Appreciative Inquiry Summit. Academy of 
Management Executive, 18(3), 67-80.   
Prior-Smith, K., & Perrin, M. (2006).  Ideas on motivating people, addressing complaints and 
training (IMPACT): An application of benchmarking. Learning best practice from 
Hewlett-Packard. Business Process Re-engineering & Management Journal, 2(1), 7-
25. 
Pyzdek, T. (1994-2004). The Six Sigma revolution. Quality America, Inc. Retrieved July 31, 
2006, from  
http://www.qualityamerica.com/knowledgecente/articles/PYZDEKSixSigRev.htm.  
91 
 Quinn, J. (1996, May). The role of good conversation in strategic control. Journal of 
Management Studies, 33(3), 381-394.  
Quinn, R. (1996). Deep change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.  
Radjou, N. (2005, March 24).  IBM transforms its supply chain to drive growth. Forrester 
Research, Inc., Best Practices case study, 2.  
Rajagopalan, N., & Spreitzer, G. (1997, January). Toward a theory of strategic change: A 
multi-lens perspective and integrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 
22(1), 48-79.   
Ramberg, J. (2000, May). Six Sigma: Fad or fundamental? Quality Digest. Retrieved July 31, 
2006, from http://www.qualitydigest.com/may00/html/sixsigmapro.html.  
Reagan, R. (1985, July 15). Executive Order 12516. Washington, DC: Office of the 
President. 
Reardon, K. (1991). What persuasion is, what it is not, and how it is maintained: Debunking 
some myths. In Persuasion in Practice. CA: Sage Publications.  
Reider, R. (2000). Benchmarking strategies: A tool for profit improvement. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons.  
Roberto, M. (2005, Summer). The art of making change initiatives stick. Sloan Management 
Review, 46(4), 53-60. 
Rumsfeld, D.H. (2002, May-June).  Transforming the military. Foreign Affairs, 20-32.  
Rumsfeld, D. (2002). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense.  
Rumsfeld, D. (2003). Annual report to the President and Congress. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Rumsfeld, D. (2001, September 30). Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense.  
Sarkis, J. (2001). Benchmarking for agility. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 8(2), 
88-107.  
Schaffer, R., & Thompson, H. (1998). Successful change program begins with results. In 
Harvard Business Review on Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Schein, E. (1999, August). Kurt Lewin's Change Theory in the field and in the classroom: 
Notes toward a model of managed learning. Reflections, 1(1), 59-74. 
Secretary of the Army.  Memorandum: management oversight of the Army’s business 
transformation initiatives. Retrieved July 31, 2006,  https://acc.dau.mil/ 
CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32338.   
92 
 Sekerka, L., Brumbaugh, A., Rosa, J., & Cooperrider, D. (2006). Comparing Appreciative 
Inquiry to problem-centered technique in organizational development: An 
experiment. This paper is being submitted to the International Journal for 
Organization Theory and Behavior.   
Simpson, M., & Kondouli, D. (2000). A practical approach to benchmarking in three service 
industries. TWM, 11(4-6), 623.  
Sirkin, H., Keenan, P., & Jackson, A. (2005, October). The hard side of change management. 
Harvard Business Review, 108-118. 
Six Sigma change agents. Graphic. Retrieved from 
http://www.qualityamerica.com/knowledgecente/ articles/PYZDEKSixSigRev.htm. 
Slone, R. (2004, October). Leading a supply chain turnaround.  Harvard Business Review, 
82(10), 114-121. 
Spear, S., & Bowen, K. (1999, September/October). Decoding the DNA of the Toyota 
production system. Harvard Business Review, 77(5), 96-106.   
Spendolini, M.J. (1992). The benchmarking book. New York: American Management 
Association.  
Sterman, J., & Repenning, N. (1997, April). Unanticipated side effects of successful quality 
programs: Exploring a paradox of organizational improvement. Management Science, 
43(4), 503-521.  
Strebel, P. (1998). Why do employees resist change? In Harvard Business Review on 
Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 139-157. 
Sullivan, L. (2004). Ready to roll: Harley-Davidson’s three-year effort to build closer ties to 
suppliers is paying off.  Information Week, 979, 45-46. 
The Observer Business & Media. (2006, July 2). Bronfman does it his way. The Observer. 
Retrieved July 25, 2006, from 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,1810495,00.html.   
Tushman, M., & O’Reilly, C. (2004, April). The ambidextrous organization. Harvard 
Business Review, 82(4), 74-81.   
US Air Force. (2004). The US Air Force transformation flight plan 2004. HQ USAF/XPXC. 
Washington, DC: author, 8. 
US Army. (2004). Army transformation roadmap. Retrieved July 16, 2006, from  
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_386_ATR_2004_Final.pdf,  
US Army. About continuous process improvement. Retrieved July 31, 2006, from 
http://www.army.mil/ArmyBTKC/focus/cpi/index.htm.  
93 
 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense 
Appropriations. (2005, March 15). Hearing: FY 2006 Navy Budget Overview. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Wahid, H., Jackson, A., & Sirkin, H. (2004, September 15). Transformation: How consumer 
companies can load the DICE in their favor. A Boston Consulting Group Publication. 
Retrieved July 25, 2006, from 
http://www.bcg.com/publications/files/Transformation_in_ 
Telecom_Loading_the_Dice_in_Your_Favor_Jan05.pdf.  
Weick, K., & Quinn, R. (1999). Organization change and development. Annual Review 
Psychology, 50, 361-386. 
Wetlaufer, S. (2001, February).  The business case against revolution. Harvard Business 
Review, 79(2), 112-199.   
Wiarda, E.A., & Luria, D.D. (1998, February).  The best-practice company and other 
benchmarking myths. Quality Progress, 91-94. 
Will, G.  (2002, July 22). Hog heaven: Harley at 100.  Newsweek, 140(4), 60. 
Wilson, A. (2005, June 20). Ford fix-up plan needs fixing. Automotive News, 79(5153), 4-5.  
Womack, J., & Jones, D. (1994, March/April). From Lean production to the Lean enterprise. 
Harvard Business Review, 72(2), 93-103.   
Yasin, M.M. (2002). The theory and practice of benchmarking: Then and now. 
Benchmarking: An International Journal, 9(3), 217-243.  
Yasin, M.M., & Dorsch, J. (1998). A framework for benchmarking in the public sector: 
Literature review and directions for future research. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, 11(2/3), 91-115.  
 
MISCELLANEOUS WEBSITE REFERENCES: 
https://ucsobdom02.hq.navy.mil/seaent/seadoc01.nsf/(vwDocsByAttachment)/About. 









http://www.gao.gov/cghome/army/img18.html, accessed 31 Jul 06. 




























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
96 
 2006 RESEARCH PRODUCTS OF THE CENTER FOR 
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Published Student Research 
NPS-CDMR-GM-06-004 Center for Navy Business Excellence: A Catalyst for Business 
Transformation. Lieutenant Gordon E. Meek, US Navy, 
December 2005 
 
NPS-CDMR-FM-06-003 Federal Financial Reform. Policy Formulation to 
Implementation: Research into Relationships between the 
President’s Management Agenda Scorecard, Federal Audited 
Financial Statements, and GAO High Risk List. Captain 
Andrew Lind, US Air Force, December 2005 
 
NPS-CDMR-HR-06-002 Performance Based Pay for the U.S Marine Corps. Major 
Henry Brown, US Marine Corps, Captain Owen Nucci, US 
Marine Corps, December 2005 
 
NPS-CDMR-HR-06-001 The Department of Homeland Security: A Gateway to Civil 
Service Reform. Lieutenant David W. Anderson, US Navy, 
Captain Joshua P. Bahr, US Marine Corps, December 2005 
Sponsored Reports 
NPS-CDMR-GM-06-007  Benchmarking Best Practices in Transformation for Sea 
Enterprise. Dr. Douglas A. Brook, NPS, Lt. Colonel Bryan 
Hudgens, NPS, September 2006. 
NPS-CDMR-HR-06-006 Legislating Civil Service Reform: The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. Dr. Douglas A. Brook, NPS, Dr. Cynthia L. King, 
NPS, LT David Anderson, US Navy, Capt Joshua Bahr, US 
Marine Corps, June 2006 
 
NPS-CDMR-LM-06-005 A Performance Metric and Goal-setting Procedure for 
Deadline-oriented Processes. Dr. Kenneth H. Doerr, NPS, Dr. 
Kevin Gue, Auburn University, December 2005. 
 
Copies of the Center for Defense Management Reform Research Reports may be printed 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
98 
 Initial Distribution List 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944; Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
3. Research Office, Code 09          1 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
4. Robert N. Beck             1 
Dean, GSBPP 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
5. Douglas A. Brook           1 
Professor, GB/Kb 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
6. Bill Gates              1 
Associate Dean for Research, GB/Gt 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
7. Bryan Hudgens             1 
Lecturer, GB/ 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
 
8. Karey L. Shaffer             1 
Program Manager, GB/Ks 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
 
 
Copies of the Center for Defense Management Reform Research Reports may be printed 
from our website www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/CDMR  
99 
